CULTURE THEORY MATTERS

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ABSTRACT: *This paper examines honor-based (H-B) and dignity-based (D-B) cultures both as theoretical concepts and as social aggregates. It begins with a defense of the 'typological' approach, grounding it in metaphysical precepts. An extensive discussion of 'dimensions' introduces variations observed between honor-based and dignity-based cultures, the latter terms there introduced and defended. Words used in common between the two cultural types but holding different connotations are also examined, with select treatment given to trust-acceptance, envy-jealousy and shame-guilt pairs. Evidence in traditional cultures links aspects of behavior to dignity-based culture in the form of hypomanic traits. Disparate ways of viewing the institution of the 'office' reveal how cross-cultural dialogues can find common ground.*

KEYWORDS: Honor, Dignity, Typology, Respect, Trust, Behavior Traits

INTRODUCTION

Two of America's most innovative anthropologists, Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead, after having made inroads with the first ever broad-ranging typological tool using the shame-guilt dimension for investigating culture, ran aground against academic fear and loathing of *dichotomies*.

One of the early superstition's workers were admonished to partake of was the dictum [1] that a psychological explanation was to be allowed only if all culturally-rooted possibilities were first exhausted. But shame and guilt, at the time the leading examples (and dichotomy) par excellence, are *biosocial*: they are each biologically mediated results of culturally- and environmentally-mediated contexts. The psychology may follow from culture but can hardly be separated arbitrarily without consequences, two of which were 1) typologies were doubly suspect [2]: "According to Mead, much of the criticism directed towards Ruth Benedict's *Patterns of Culture* was based on the critic's failure to grasp the fact that Benedict was not dealing with typologies in the sense that cultures can be seen as elaborating psychological or biological givens.", and 2) anthropologists took actual psychological causes for cultural artifacts, all but obviating intelligent inquiry; many of the significant discoveries were made by non-experts who simply used common sense in recording what they saw: "To do a good job [field work] on Russian society required a kind of 'feel' that few trained and unbiased observers possessed." [3]

Sociologists Max Weber and Talcott Parsons are two of the very few then or since who have understood the value of typologically-based methodologies. Here is Weber [4] –

The premise has been repeatedly stated that the science of sociology attempts to formulate typological concepts and generalized uniformities of empirical process.

Parsons [5], however, identifies a problem:

In formulating his classification…Weber neglected to develop the analysis of the structure of a total social system which is a logically necessary prerequisite of such a classification.

African Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities Research
Vol.1, No.1, pp.1-25, 2018
www.abjournals.org

An instance of Parson's "total social system" is the honor-dignity global set of relations that we argue should replace the shame-guilt dimension of Benedict-Mead. It grounds the values and applications of law, religion and authority (both personal and social). This it does because it is itself a construct of two binaries arranged as in the last two rows in Table (1), where dignity's 'authority' (based on power) is obviously distinct from that seen in the H-B group (based on respect). Thus, in the D-B group authority comes almost entirely via innumerable offices, which are far fewer but more extensive in the essential H-B unit. (H-B) = honor-based; (C-H) = cult of honor; (C-D) = cult of dignity, and (D-B) = dignity-based.

The Metaphysical Construct Behind the 'Total Social System' [6]

Table 1.

AUTHOR	ESSENCE	BEING	EXISTENCE	EMERGENT
Aristotle	Formal Cause	Efficient Cause	Material Cause	Final Cause
Zhuangzi	Amorphous Realm	Vital Energy	Form	Life
Hegel	Thesis	Antithesis	Synthesis	N/A
Peirce	Sign	Object	Interpretant	N/A
	(Firstness)	(Secondness)	(Thirdness)	N/A
Lao Tzu	First	Second	Third	Multiplicity
Weiss	Essence	Action	Existence	God
Paradigmatic	Essence	Being	Existence	Reality
	Will	Power/Influence	Obligation/Respect	Authority
Social System	(H-B)	(C-H)	(C-D)	(D-B)

The flow of conceptual relations between each member of a row is left to right and is dynamic because building concepts from previous components – in turn requiring strict relations to one another that are labelled across the top of the table. The system is called 'paradigmatic' because each row has the structure of a paradigm (the structural backbone or model of a set of processes); select members will comprise a vertical array that is also paradigmatic, as for example 'essence' – where 'formal', 'firstness', 'will, and 'H-B' are its 'analogues'. Differently stated, in the *essential* archetype (a *form*) of a society, the primary or '*first*' principle is achieved through cooperative and collective *will* which determines the traits best associated with the *honor-based* group, whereas in the *emergent dignity-based* society the 'first' principle is achieved by communal satisfaction of individual aspirations.

With the methodological criteria in mind (Table 1, next to last row) a powerful heuristic can be employed to address the matter of authority. By way of a question: What three words, no fewer nor more, can totally deliver the essential character of authority? Those with authority must be '*willing*' to use it when called for (in the form of 'power'; or in the H-B sense, 'influence'), lest it atrophy or fail to command regard. Additionally, there must be a will to obey the limitations ('obligations'; in the H-B society, 'respect') inherent to its exercise; and as well to prosecute objectives to completion. 'Will' is thus the *Essence* of authority, '*power*' is the action-filled *Being* of authority (responsible also for influence), and *Existence* grounds the 'obligations' (including respect). In the vertical paradigm, will reflects *Essence*, power reflects *Being*, and obligation *Existence*.

Those skeptical of this particular application of the methodology (to the word 'authority') can perform a check of their own. Presuming some basic awareness of Christian principles, and treating God as an ultimate 'authority', one can locate instances throughout the Bible that will justify the Father's *will*, the *power* of the Holy Spirit, and the *obligation* fulfilled by Christ as Son and Word. All that has been done is to state the elements of the Holy Trinity as reflecting (that is, being analogues of) the methodological archetypes. One of the modes of authority we will observe is allied to the Cult of Dignity (C-D). Sennet [7] relates it as follows: "The dilemma of authority in our time, the peculiar fear it inspires, is that *we feel attracted to strong figures we do not believe to be legitimate*."

In summary, from Table (1) authority is taken to be an *emergent property* realized from the cumulative interplay and integration of its discreet constituents, each reflecting the archetype corresponding to its positions in the flow. Lest we make the embarrassing mistake that compelled Friedrich Nietzsche (in the second edition of *The Birth of Tragedy*) to literally immolate himself in public we must be mindful of one fact above all others: *each and every* person, group, moiety, society – is a composite of *both* cognates of *any* given dimension. The validity of our efforts comes from empirical data demonstrating a sufficient preponderance of one cognate over the other such as to lend statistical warrant to the findings. When someone says, 'You take after your mother', they are saying that the mass drift of alleles (traits) during meiosis favored your embryo getting more expression from her than from your father. There really is no need to complicate matters, for that is all there is to it. The trick, to the extent there is one, is to utilize dimensions that are operational, that can be quantified.

Fundamental Dimensions

It remains to be explained *why* both honor-based and dignity-based traits exist. H-B traits reflect the needs and methods enabling survival in a dangerous world. This is of the essence; it seems trite, but some simplicities really are true, and this is one of the most important in all of sociology, anthropology and political science. In the most elemental societies two sets of traits stand out. The first deals with inter-personal relations and specifies how authority is to be handled (very carefully). Having the sort of authority that carries the power of coercion is felt to be dangerous and productive of dysfunction and disorder throughout society. The second set deals with outsiders and their relation to the egoistic self-view of insiders, who provide posterity with the origin of xenophobia and various reasons for imprecation or condemnation directed at suspicious strangers. The idea that flows through both of these descriptions is simply, 'danger'.

Mankind did at length discover a way to rise above the worst problems with methods that together comprise what we latterly mean by the word 'civilization'. Societies everywhere developed themselves in part by advancing public service by means of the various professions (cults of honor which are in large part a source of what will become 'dignity'), starting with religions and militaries. In all offices the bottom line is an ideal of the honor-based life – values of, by and for the community – the cult of honor, featuring leaders saddled with stewardship responsibilities. Add this paternalistic turn to maternal instincts toward children and the motherly recognition of need for food and shelter, and we discern the ideal D-B objectives clothed initially in very similar honor-based formulations (but which stressed protection and security of the group as opposed to the individual and her rights). Where the H-B looked through the lens of respect, merited worth and trust, the slowly developing D-B society focused on acceptance, inherency of worth, and faith (Figure 1).

With the exception of Rome and early England (that we know of) all D-B entities have arisen out from the turmoil of the Continental and Scottish Enlightenments. Kant dared us to think and to thus challenge the authorities who seemed happiest and wealthiest when the public was at its most ignorant and cowed. Adam smith created modern economics from moral postulates that men could actually benefit one another while striving to benefit themselves. These are not precepts one expects from a classic honor-based culture.

The long and short of the rise of D-B societies is the development of civilization to the point where reasonably long stretches of calm allowed a reset of the social thermostat. With less hardship and turmoil there was allowance for ideas as well as the development of social structures to better protect from what nature was still able to land when it threw a a punch.


Fig. 1.

Figure (2) shows how eight dimensions (the topmost being the canopy binary) can be seen to relate to one another via those serving as 'conventions. Those that are not conventions are 'ornaments', from the idea that we 'wear' these cognates in as our normal expressions of comportment and deportment. The traits associated with H-B groups are those under 'Honor' in the figure, and likewise the D-B traits follow under 'Dignity'. We can 'read' the honor-based side as follows (italicizing cognates): *Acquired* deeds earn esteem taking the form of

respect, which engenders *trust* and trustworthiness. But these three dimensions together are essentially just *status*. The legal historian Henry Sumner Maine [9] succinctly summarized the progress of mankind in saying that cultures advanced from status-oriented to those reliant on the concepts underlying the contract.

The word Status may be usefully employed to construct a formula expressing the law of progress…which…seems to me to be sufficiently ascertained. If then we…avoid applying the term [status] to such conditions as are the immediate or remote result of agreement, we may say that the movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement *from Status to Contract*.

Everyone achieves some form or kind of status, but all alike apply status via *spirit* and *prerogative* to achieve desired ends. These three dimensions can be summarized as *participation*, which is a convention in honor-based societies because those who refuse to participate are frowned upon and isolated from good society. The idea that worth must be acquired is a convention for the same reason; failure to *acquire* respect, trust and status presupposes that one

expects these benefits by virtue of others. This attitude will isolate the individual.

We 'read' the dignity-based side as follows: essential worth is *inherent*, and is to be universally *accepted* on *faith*. A consequence of this is that D-B people grant benefit of the doubt often without requiring to see any prior confirmatory evidence. *Contracts* work essentially the same way, one reason why modern honor-based societies were slow to take to business contracts, favoring building relationships of trust first. Many are still that way, for example China.

Table 2. [10]					
Tier One & Two Dimensions – Office and Ethos					
H-B	C-H	C-D	D-B	Degree/Dimension	Descriptor
1° *Sources of Obligation*		*Thirdness*		1°	
Merited	Merited	Inherent	Inherent	Merited v. Inherent	Worth
Respect	Respect	Acceptance	Acceptance	Respect v. Acceptance	Belief
Realism	Mixed	Mixed	Idealism	Realism v. Idealism	Philosophy
2° *Moderating Power*		*Secondness*		2°	
Praise-Bad	Aretaic	Should-Blame	Deontic	Aretaic v. Deontic	Norms
Quiet Prerog.	Loud Prerog.	Warm Authority	Cool Authority	Prerogative v. Authority	Office
Shame	Shame	Mixed	Guilt	Shame v. Guilt	Motivation
3° *Manifesting Will*		*Firstness*		3°	
Trust	Trust	Mixed	Faith	Trust v. Faith	Reliance
Implied Contract	Status	Mixed	Contract	Status v. Contract	Manner
Mistrust	Defense	Offence	Curiosity	Avoidance v. Adience	Intentionality

Everyone *represents* the 'social contract' when they exercise *authority* and do so by *principle*, the result of which is that the D-B folk operate basically from an 'ethical' vantage, whereas the H-B contingency takes things from a moral posture. Ethics tends to be a personal matter for Americans, morality a more public matter for the H-B. Some, especially Triandis et al., [11] treat all of these matters from the vantage of the individual-collective dimension. We utilize this where it is helpful but are of the opinion that dignity and honor have more to say about the definitions of individualism and collectivism than the other way around.

We can 'read' Table (2) in a similar fashion (omitting for the moment C-H and C-D) and you will better see how several dimensions relate to one another from a metaphysical foundation. Note the Peircean terms and the paradigmatic equivalents. The dimensions listed 'as such' (toward the right in the table) are divided vertically in terms that end up being levels of relevance to the honor-dignity binary. Thus, the most relevant dimensions are the 1° triad of pairs, and so forth.

Variant Meanings

We cannot help but apply or receive words shared by diverse cultures that nonetheless mean fairly distinct things in each, and are thus productive of miscomprehensions. In this section we go through the major dimensions and beyond but with an eye toward how we and others see the same words differently.

Throughout the honor-based universe, *shame* is a condition of mind functioning like a Freudian superego – dissuading the very acts that D-B cultures describe as resulting in the selfsame word. Likewise, *merit* is the quality of means and/or the benefits of objectives by which the H-B person gains respect for demonstrated worth. The D-B equivalent reflects an impression of the done deal regardless the raison d'dêtre – merit describing what has been achieved.

Both the fact of and the quality of D-B marriage reflect a looser attitude toward status and a move further in the D-B direction. Still today, status remains important in India, Greece, Italy and many others. Some of these have more or less adopted legal and religious doctrines that vaguely define the dignity-based moiety, but remain as 'transitional' cultures because the impact of status is so widespread. The U. S. was until recently just barely advanced beyond transitional status and is out of reach from backsliding owing only to the recent rulings on gay marriage and related cases.

Margaret Mead [12] long ago warned anthropologists about going overboard favoring the *individualist-collectivist* distinction. Sapir [13] was of the same opinion: "Too great agility has been gained over the years in jumping from the individual to the collectivity via romantic anthropological path back again to the culture-saturated individual." What is being ignored is that dignity-based people spend a third of their lives (half of their waking lives) at work, which tend to be largely 'collectivistic', to say nothing of associations and sporting events. Nor does the theory adequately address why native groups from the Maya of South America to the Eskimo groups feature an unaccountable degree of 'individualism'. The labels are both useful and descriptive but relative to actually explaining matters, the honor-dignity binary does far better in our estimation.

The country of France hails from the people calling themselves the Franks, which in their language meant 'the free'. Free from what? From *dependence* and/or submission. Orphans by and large fair especially poorly (as do the homeless and beggars) in H-B moieties because they

of all disadvantaged people are the most dependent. The ancient Greeks had strictures against moral omission here, responding no doubt to the obvious: you don't arrive at rules like that if or when people are angelic. All the same, the great majority of honor-based peoples agree in in requiring good faith efforts to meet (true merit for exceeding) community standards of usefulness as opposed to idleness.

Thus 'independence' and 'freedom' for them is more about avoiding dependence (or being subjugated) than about autonomy per se. Our 'freedom' to do whatever we will' is very modern and at times elitist. Back in the real honor-based world, "If you experience misfortune you are personally responsible for being weak" [14]. "The language of rejection: making it safe to declare the need for stronger people, for an anchor in the world, by rejecting the legitimacy of those who are strong" [15]. This can be restated: 1) H-B dependence implies that one is too weak to gain or maintain independence, and 2) being dependent on those earning (meriting) the right to be truly strong is far less an issue, for what sturdies the deck is having a ruler capable of maintaining structural integrity and security. This plays into the widespread tolerance of top-heavy authoritarian regimes.

Trust and faith are, in addition to independence-dependence, the most difficult dimension to deal with. *Trust* and *acceptance* are both cognates of a first-tier dimension (Table 2). Trust goes with H-B, acceptance with D-B. What follows is a statement excerpted from the changingminds.org website, under the heading 'Principle of trust' –

If I trust you, I will accept what you say as true and expose my vulnerabilities to you.

Russians, an H-B people, will draw a clearer impression from this, and also place a unique value to it that will escape a D-B person. "If you felt bored or tired or sad in Russian company," observes Miller [16], "it was a solecism *not* to admit it if asked" [my stress]. Expressing vulnerabilities essentially tests the hearers, challenging them to respond in kind. If that happens, each respect and trusts the other, and that is what it's ultimately about – who trusts whom and how much. Of course, vulnerability is dangerous, and Russians know this all too well. They worry at what they have said, wondering if they will have cause to rue it later [17]: "There was always the danger that someone might entice you into revealing yourself, only then to turn around and punish you for what you have revealed."

Here is the same sentence with the cognates reversed:

If I <u>accept</u> you, I will <u>trust</u> what you say as true and expose my vulnerabilities to you.

This is more the D-B style. Acceptance – what it means by whatever term a culture possesses – entails exposure and vulnerability. In a D-B group, wherever there is trust there is by definition faith, and faith with acceptance all but define vulnerability. The core of this sentence invites the D-B reader to place the meaning in relation to the cognate 'acceptance'.

Though D-B peoples pride themselves on 'airing our dirty laundry' [18], ask anybody from a foreign land outside of Europe and the common law states if they feel the same. Not in the slightest. The honor-based do not, except by force of circumstance, ever accept blame. Our 'not guilty' plea is a descendant of that attitude. But our 'innocent until proven guilty' is a dignity-based rendition of the logic that follows upon the H-B core idea concerning guilt.

For the honor-based, trust is a means of deciding how and when to negotiate reality in a cruel, capricious and changeable world. The need for certainty and security makes 'trust' what it is

African Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities Research
Vol.1, No.1, pp.1-25, 2018
www.abjournals.org

and why jumping off ramps without it is tantamount to exposure and high vulnerability. It appears in variable guises; here is an interesting example (Salacuse, 2004: Abstract):

When Enron was still – and only – a pipeline company, it lost a major contract in India because local authorities felt that it was pushing negotiations too fast. In fact, the loss of the contract underlines the important role that cultural differences play in international negotiation. For one country's negotiators, time is money; for another's, the slower the negotiations, the better and more trust in the other side. [19]

D-B folk are apt to believe that how *they* do things is the most reasonable way, while our Chinese and other friends across the table think very differently. What goes wrong in a boardroom frequently goes wrong in diplomacy for many of the same reasons. Former President Bill Clinton will disagree, but pushing and cajoling Yasser Arafat to a conclusion at Camp David sent the basic message that he, Clinton, was not trustworthy. Allowing the mere impression of forcing a contract demonstrates a one-lane, one-way road. It presupposes lack of consideration for others. Clinton was pressing too hard, proceeding too rapidly. Arafat only did what was right and prudent. And proved that Americans are slow learners.

For many if not most traditional honor-based cultures authority functions strictly by the respect owed it; in these same societies D-B people seem 'loud'. Our (American) open and frank talk is interpreted as brash and invasive. Our tone of voice is also loud. Such people the quiet folk do not, because cannot, trust. Of those meeting these 'loud' criteria, a group known to psychiatry fits the bill famously: those with hypomanic syndromes [20] (Ratey, 1997 and Gartner 2011).

The people who generate the most wealth for a society, are much more likely to have what I called a hypomanic temperament. People with this biologically based temperament have, as a stable trait, heightened energy, drive, ambition, confidence, creativity and risk tolerance and are thus more likely to be the kind of charismatic visionary leaders who start enterprises of all types, including businesses. [21]

Americans elect, for example, strong bipolar personalities (in which a constellation of hypomanic traits becomes evident to those friends and family who know what to look for) to high offices without the slightest thought of accountability. Charles Valentine [22] wrote that the men manifesting a collection of traits that look (to trained observers) suspiciously like the litany culled from DSM-III, -IV and -V [23] make plausible his observation that "in most situations the aggressive, mobile men…are best equipped temperamentally to learn the ways of the wider colonial society and to deal with Europeans. In particular, their relative ability to overcome shame is important here." Quiet societies and many loud as well, require shame as a deterrent from the inside, the super-ego, and its expression is through a quiet dignity of reserve bordering on detachment. Shameless people are loud people incapable of meriting honor.

We find these hypomanic types everywhere, but especially in politics, business, art, discovery and invention. We find them as well wherever there is severe or continual stress. Here is the same circumstance translated to a business context [24]:

Rewarding top advertising talent [those most apt to bear bipolar traits] with a supervisory position can seriously backfire, especially in today's market. It's understandable to want to reward exceptional workers, but managers often believe that the only way they can do so is by

promoting them to supervisory roles. This thinking is not only untrue, it is dangerous. … Today's marketing environment makes it treacherous to move ad agency employees around without planning.

The relevance is best defined by the article's title: 'Don't Be Mad About Promoting Madmen (or Women)'. Translation: Don't be crazily rewarding and promoting nonsupervisory high energy bipolar personalities, those who appear to staid bosses and peers as occasionally 'mad'.

Figure (1) also lists the dimension 'participation-representation'. Methodologically, we want to bear something in mind. H-B 'representation' is what we term a 'sign' with respect to its referent. This sign is a stylized, generalized, iconic analogue of the referent. The sign 'man' might be a person talking to you; or perhaps the figure in a photograph, or the likeness in a statue, or an abstract concept encompassing mankind. D-B folk, on the one hand, use the word 'representation' to indicate the altered presence of something that nonetheless speaks to the whole as would a synecdoche. To say it differently but equivalently, Americans elect Congress to represent their manifold general external *interests* (that is, not themselves per se, as is the case with the H-B, who are more like the lawyer to her client, who deals with the *personal* interest, and where every man represents his family; his dishonor becomes his family's dishonor).

Table (3) lists both cognates of the top tier dimensions for each binary cognate in order to show majority-minority meanings of the same terms across the culture gap; it allows a direct comparison and contrast of words respected equally by both moieties but nuanced differently.

Lessons Learned

Once we understand how the same words mean different things across cultures (even within the same country) we can use tables based on paradigmatic methodology without as much risk of needless mistakes, as in Table (2). It is worthwhile appreciating the all-important flexibility of our native tongue. When other language groups borrow our words, they tailor them to far more limited semantic resources; ergo, the successful borrowings happen when they feel certain about the bond. All of which of course is a wide-open invitation for us *not* to understand the nuance they observe, and yet because they saw and took, *their* meanings are crystal clear – to themselves. A good bit of this is a one-way exercise owing to our flexibility and the occasional lack thereof in the traditional honor-based equivalents. Here, then, are some of the takeaways from the use of our tables and the related discussions.

1) No one living in a dignity-based country needs to be well versed in the metaphysics of dignity to realize – as does just about any observant foreigner – that the legislature, police and judiciary exist to assure that the D-B can be and act themselves ('individualists' as some render it). They have *rights*. Institutions exist to protect those rights, but we should understand that these rights exist only because an abstract, inherent *dignity* provides them.

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Vol.1, No.1, pp.1-25, 2018
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Table 3. H-B			D-B		
Merit Self-credit on condition of other-credit	**Respect** Earned on esteem from merit Requires contin-uous meriting Authority permits cmmand-ing of respect	**Trust** Earned from tradition of respectability Required prior to placing faith	**Merit** That deserving of regard Generally said of persons, not groups	**Respect** General term indicating worth, regard, merit, from inter-personal far more than public	**Trust** Usually sign for placing faith. Otherwise about the same as in H-B
Inherency Used with status or physical properties only	**Acceptance** Regarding children same but more intense than D-B. Otherwise used as a kind of toleration for what is not approved	**Faith** Earnest regard or identifica-tion with religious figures. Otherwise rarely found	**Inherency** Conceptualize d transfer of immaterial properties to all alike of a set or class	**Acceptance** Tolerance out of a sense of duty to principle. Used ethically than morally	**Faith** Reflecting unconditional devotion to a principle

NOTES TO TABLE 3.

1. Earned H-B worth tends to take the form of acts bringing self-credit as well as honor to the family (or another group *represented*). By "self-credit" I mean another notch on the worth scale, where each addition calls for a slight additional respect, or a better and more solid foundation on which to be thought trustworthy.
2. Greek ostracism occurred when the honoree failed to continue meriting position, evidence of course when transgressing the principle on which honor is predicated.
3. Note that the D-B feel far more devoted to personal than to public interactions.
4. Inherency to the H-B pertains to aristocratic deservedness coming with the genes, conduct is supposed to reflect that status.
5. By and large, H-B parents are more and less devoted to their children. Usually more; they leave children to their own devices more, or they have them always under thumb (usually distinguishing *quiet* subtype – free-wheeling – from the loud and authoritarian (teaching via guilt is an in between variant, as for example in Russia)
6. The H-B are moralistic, not so much ethical, vice versa for D-B. Similarly, H-B more earnestly spiritual, often to extremes, the D-B basically principled, often to extremes (ignoring religion).
7. Note the remarkable resemblance between our faith and the expression in Hebrews 11.1. "Now faith is the assurance of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen."

2) Both the D-B and H-B societies want opportunity for all, but for different reasons. This is not unusual. "[It] seems unrealistic to us – although in most non-Western societies the right to nurturance [opportunity] is taken for granted and exercised face-to-face" [25]. We have seen the reason elsewhere. As before, the same here: without a baseline of 'equal opportunity' society becomes destabilized, something anathema to the H-B notions of survival. The D-B want the same things, but for the reason the *philosophes* did: because all alike deserve the right to exercise their dignity to the natural maximum, which presupposes a baseline of equal opportunity. You don't rise to that level of idealism when reality is itself a barrier.

You are not responsible to anybody else for success with an equal opportunity baseline. One respects dignity by living up to this implied admonishment to exercise responsibility in the favorable position of not being *dependent* on others. The H-B know this because they actually believe in the baseline. And it goes far to explain why they are adamant that all do their duty to society by holding down a real job, no excuses. The D-B deny that same opportunity and then react worse even than the H-B as they sanctimoniously hurl invectives at supposedly lazy sorts (especially if living on public assistance).

3) Honor-based peoples have been historically mistrustful, both of one another as well as of foreigners. Dignity, on the other hand, is like a child; it is in theory and principle color-blind and willing to meet and get along with just about anyone (that it fails in practice is discussed in connection with the cult of dignity). Honor-based peoples value honor, of course; it is the true coin of the realm with a value to be revered and protected. In Gaul, the Romans [26] observed that the local tribes did not barricade themselves at night for protection as did they themselves, for fear of sneak attacks and thievery. The locals knew better than to violate H-B sanctity.

4) Acceptance and respect are two faces of regard; one allows closer contact, the other requires a distance. Likewise, one permits familiarity, the other likely will not. In a dignity-based society the one fundamental expectation is that dignity be *accepted*. That implies the outward respect of all the rights that necessarily flow from dignity. So it isn't that dignity-based people don't value respect; but at the level of mythic statements, one's acceptance, being *prior* to respect, entitles a degree of reverence. Dignity-based peoples are broadly tolerant, again owing to acceptance. They are also generally optimistic, owing largely to an acceptance of *themselves* – their self-assuredness and self-confidence – which speaks again to a 'spiritual' presence of *authority* (the D-B are not without various meanings of 'spiritual').

APPLIED TYPOLOGY

Envy and Jealousy

One anthropologist, J. L. Caughey, working in a Micronesian community, suggested that this people communicated with what amounted to – what any of us would be sore tempted to call – a 'respect language'. Any attentive anthropologist would be able to say the same of almost any traditional society, including not just a few pocket sub-cultures within modern nation-states: indigenous cultures in particular, but also some we Americans usually fail to see as such, namely, the occasional corporate, bureaucratic and professional cultures. The most interesting groups, perhaps because the most colorful, are in the 'loud' sub-categories of our typology. An in-depth analysis of the Fa'a'nakkar culture applies and extends what has been asserted thus far. Excerpts are indented and followed with commentary.

Bravery does not mean looking for fights, it does not mean being arrogant and starting fights. It means being respectful – until someone wants a fight. The envy of 'strong thought' is not the same as (regular) envy. It means that if someone else has a boat, I will also get a boat…. It makes us feel good inside. Envy just means that I despise the fact that he has a boat and I do not. The happy envy (of strong thought) means that I myself will get one. [27]

Honor-based societies are thought to be exceptionally prone to, and moved by, envy [28]. In fact, we argue 1) that envy and jealousy have been misconstrued, and 2) that jealousy is more

correctly attributed to honor-based groups and envy more to the dignity-based. Here is how an excellent thesaurus considers these words (*Oxford American Writer's Thesaurus*, 2004):

Envious implies wanting something that belongs to another and to which one has no particular right or claim…**Jealous** may refer to a strong feeling of envy…or it may imply an intense effort to hold on to what one possesses.

This reflects how an impartial and careful intellectual might view the matter but, as with all dictionaries, it is how current language usage views it. It is a tad off; the issue distinguishing the words envy and jealousy relates to the subtexts implied in their use. Thus, envy reflects what one wistfully wishes s/he could have happened upon (ought to have happened upon) or what one feels as if deserving or meritorious. It need not and usually does not imply distaste or ill-will toward the person who actually has possession. In jealousy one feels deserving of what is not possessed, and imputes lack of deservedness in the actual possessor. In this case only one was deserving and by that fact none others are deserving, whence those wrongfully gaining an advantage are targets of ill-will or malice.

Placing this into cultural perspective: Respect-mongering (reflecting 'prerogative', Table 2, tier 2) seeks recognition for presumed merit – the claim, in particular, that one knowingly deserves the valued possession of respect, repute. Should a competitor instead get what one feels to deserve, jealously rules, and it rules supreme. If another possesses what we merely wish, however dearly, it is envy, pure and simple. Thus, for a dignity-based person, old money or new, inherited or merited, earned income or passive income, none of this is the gravamen; none of it imputes ill-will, none of it makes oneself feel worse for wear (okay, we might feel a tad smaller when we are 'green with envy').

We would like now to rephrase the opening excerpt; altered words are italicized.

The envy of strong thought is not the same as *jealousy* (regular envy). It means that if someone else has a boat I will also get a boat…. I will also want to outdo him, mine will be bigger than his…. *Jealousy* just means that I despise the fact that he has a boat and I do not.

These, good folk doubtless had no word corresponding to jealously, and the anthropologist is not to be faulted for laboring under the reigning anthropological mis-direction. His analysand *did*, however, clearly have a canopy word that in one sense spoke to envy (strong = good) and the other to jealously (regular, less good). To our way of thinking, this primitive people had things better figured out than us smarty-pants. The rule, again: envy is to all intents and purposes associated with just a few 'loud' H-B groups but principally with D-B moieties, and jealousy with the 'classic' H-B groups.

The Loud Traits

For the Fa'a'nakkar, beliefs about 'good' and 'bad' are expressed through three-character dimensions, each consisting of a pair of synonyms [29]. Excerpts are indented.

1) bravery, mastery, power; 2) respectfulness, humility, kindness; 3) strong thought, competitive thought; weak thought, lazy thought.

In each instance the first term listed will name the respective category. Compare this with our metaphysical pattern of *will* (strong thought), *power* (power); *obligation* (kindness, like the obligation repaid with kindness). These terms are also the basic categories by which an

individual's personality or 'character' is classified and evaluated. Every member of this society is judged to be brave or cowardly, respectful or arrogant, and strong or weak of thought. Enduring pain without flinching is said to be bravery; declining an invitation to fight is cowardly; modesty downplays the extent of one's magical abilities, yelping 'What?' in a loud voice is arrogance [= 'loud'], acquiring many lands [= 'loud'] is strong thought, and being without tools for work is deemed weak thought [dependent].


Fig. 2.

Figure (2) shows how these pairs are related. Three dyads are each joined by double lines. In addition two composites are identified. In the figure they are the top and bottom triads. The absolute ideal combines bravery + respectfulness + strong thought. The worst has arrogance + cowardice + weak thought.

The opposite of respectfulness is *arrogance*. A person of arrogance is 'uncivilized'; 1) He does not understand respect etiquette. That is, (a) his actions indicate that he does not really feel respect for others though he may make a show of it, (b) he deliberately and insultingly fails to offer the forms of respect behavior to others in situations where they are required or appropriate. This means he is presumptuously demeaning them by acting as if they were afraid of him, subservient to him, or socially below him; 2) he lacks sympathetic concern for others. He does not care about their difficulties and he does not adequately fulfill his substantive obligations; 3) He is assertive, and 'belligerent', 'forceful in his movements', and given to 'loud, crude, argumentative speech'; 4) He becomes anger quickly; 5) He brags or makes an improper show of pride in his powers of accomplishments; He engages in behavior proper only for one in a higher social position. He acts with unjustified social superiority. [29-30]

This recalls Ruth Benedict's observation [31] that, "It does not matter what kind of 'abnormality' we choose for illustration..., there are well-described cultures in which these abnormals function at ease and with honor, and apparently without danger or difficulty to the society."

Three overriding points should stand out for remark:

1) In the company of one another, every jot and tittle of the above constitute hypomanic behaviors. The 'primitives' know enough to distrust and often dishonor these folks. "When confronted with arrogance a person should abandon his usual respectfulness and, 'no longer concerned with outcomes' respond totally from bravery and strong thought." [32]

What, may we ask, is *our* problem? We have these 'bipolar personalities' throughout the business community. "We speak of such persons," notes Kroeber [33], "quite properly, descriptively and without stigma, as being for instance of manic-depressive *temperament*" [my emphasis]. Caricatures never fail to make the point clear, as in the rent-a-car commercial featuring a self-anointed 'control freak' who chooses cars in the lot as he would his women. We laugh; it is, after all, funny. But when these people are in charge of derivatives and credit swaps we are heedlessly unaware that legally obligated stewardship would have prevented expensive and dangerous downsides.

2) The staple of survival and the demand for order. We see demands placed upon all who would aspire to status – that they must strive to perform maximally, an attitude necessary also for defense, and that in addition helps prevent disorder as happens when people aren't pulling their share, whereat it causes jealously and friction, then feuds. 'Order' can also become an excuse, so relevant does it become in trying times. Richards [34] records this from Russians just after the 'fall' of 1989: "Night after night they would gather at the house and try and convince us that thirty million lives, the Terror, none of that mattered where the end result was order."

Respectfulness is frequently a way of showing off one's status and powers without ruffling feathers. Generosity (the Greeks called it 'magnanimity'), as it is defined here, seems to embrace the potlatch ceremonies in which high status personages separate themselves from significant wealth in part to establish status precedence but also, more to our point, to offer a public gesture that in power they will have no desire or reason to aggrandize upon it. In times of crisis this prevents division from internal strife over disagreements in policy.

3) The disposition to nurture or otherwise acquire the traits just described, and those ancillary thereto (as for example the tendency towards 'thin-skinnedness'), is fostered from an early age, when children are either left to 'duke it out', or the boys become the subjects of unrelenting strictness. Often another equally common stratagem is present, namely, needling and hectoring. Truly they are together far worse than mere strictness. The topic is interesting and will be further examined in the next section.

Rearing the Middle Way

Rearing that breeds a need to be respected is not a natural mode. It is a culturally embedded modality because of the need for protection and order. So embedded are these that they are second nature, and so they are retained long after the rationale has been long since waned. Such is the case with most honor-based societies today. There is one curious matter that has stood the test of time; while not specific to defense or order, it is so companionable with them that its continued expression through rearing methods has actually had beneficial results sufficient to keep the methods alive in the absence of any other rationale. We are speaking of 'the middle way'.

If strictness and hectoring are opposites in a continuum, the middle way is represented by admonishment, cajoling and guilt-instilling techniques. "But what most differentiates Russian

parents from their American counterparts," notes Bronfenbrenner [35], "is the emotional loading of the parent-child relationship, both in its positive and negative aspects." The societies with astonishingly successful educational attainment records use varying combinations of the strict and middle way both at home and then again throughout school, as for instance China and South Korea. Russia has long experience with the middle way and has apparently not only kept it but steadily improved upon it (ostensibly to better engender communism). Today, Russia is scarcely more communistic than any usual socialistic enterprise, but these middle way ideas just may catch on. But here is an example of the 'negative' method [36]:

After giving the reprimand, one should not permit himself to resume his usual affectionate manner with the child…. For a period of time it is necessary to remain pointedly reserved with the child and somewhat cold, thereby showing him that his disobedience has hurt the adult. This measure turns out to be very effective and, in most instances, gives a palpable result….

"There was more to it than ordinary indulgence. It was disproportionate, as though the parents wished to compensate…for the lifetime of constraint which they knew lay ahead of them." [37] Indulgence of children is a widely noted trait of most H-B cultures [38]: "Like all observers of Indians [Champlain]…noted their indulgence of children, but far from being charmed by this trait he was shocked, as any well-bred Frenchman would be, to see children strike their parents."

Mary Kingsley is now largely forgotten, but in her day, she ruffled feathers and was (a century almost to the year after Mary Wollstonecraaft) one of those women whose achievements turned them into role models. Kingsley, for her part, refused the label 'New Woman' and may well have increased her real impact for having played down the obvious. Her intense interest in spirituality and anthropology led to fascinating, if also titillating, consequences.

[U]nless you live among the natives you can never get to know them. At first you see nothing but a confused stupidity and crime; but when you get to see – well! you see things worth seeing. I will import to you, in strict confidence, for if it were known it would damage me badly, my opinion on the African. He is not 'half devil and half child', any more than he is 'our benighted brother' and all that sort of thing. He is a woman…I know [this] because I am a woman, a woman of a masculine race but a woman still. [39]

A little further research [40] (Kingsley, 2000) reveals that her subjects in Africa role-reversed relative to English society. *Men* did the hectoring and needling of the kids, not the women. Dress it how you will, authoritarianism, heckling, hectoring and needling, as well as implicit or explicit threats are almost universal in the *early* honor-based societies. At length, the child learns one of the most important lessons of life: be worthy of respect and give others their due. Regrettably a downside of all of this is, still today, a competitiveness that feeds combativeness, and no minor amount of insecurity into the bargain. If good test scores are worth the downside, so be it; but the middle way may possibly temper the worst of the competitive habits.

Shame and Guilt

Shame and guilt were for decades the most famous dimension; they are fascinating for being so directly relevant to conduct. Of course, each presupposes a falling away from responsibility. Shame is associated with over-stating or over-stepping propriety; guilt comes in denying or forsaking what should have been accepted. Both of these are so utterly human (and no one denies they are inextricably interrelated) that it seems perhaps odd that Ruth Benedict should

have chosen these two as differentiae in her initial culture typology. Yet it is undeniably true that shame is of greater concern to the honor-based groups and that guilt is more frequently found with the dignity-based (especially in societies where religious influence holds that we are inherently sinful, whence guilty by association). By the same token, we have just seen that there are honor-based cultures in which guilt is used as a disciplinary tool.

People are surprised to learn that the 'Hungarian liar' disarms his accuser with guilt: 'What kind of person are you that would think to accuse somebody like me of this kind of thing?!' Even the importance attached in honor-based societies to 'having shame' is as often as not aimed at possessing a ready-made guilt response to current matters from past or possible violations. These and similar reasons forced the once popular shame-guilt typology from prominence and into near obscurity. Said Cairns [41], "I feel there is little to be gained by the continued application of the shame-culture versus guilt-culture antithesis, and would prefer to see it abandoned….".

Shame and guilt, like the other cognate pairs, are relevant to the overall typology but not sufficiently so to actually define it. They are, however, inherently tied to the ever-popular "individualist/collectivist" dimension if only because shame (in our D-B usage) arrives when *individuals* break a 'respect-bond' in a *collective* context; and guilt trains the superego to avoid the same. Of course, the reason for this dimension is that we associate honor-based groups with a broad consideration given to the needs of the group in which members receive honor as a badge of prominence in building and/or maintaining communitarian spirit. The D-B observe the comparative opposite; dignity is an immaterial source of individualist rights and responsibilities. But to blankly identify this 'communitarian spirit' as the basis for an explanative label is to be logically inept.

The predominating fear in the vast majority of cultures has always been that powerful individuals will get a clique or faction behind them and with that reserve of will and support become the cause of trouble. Individuals are therefore kept in place with requirements oriented toward the community rather than toward their own potential power base. This is indeed a principal reason why 'respect' figures so prominently in the honor-based moiety. It is not the respect in a 'personality cult' context, but in a 'respect your place' context, what the ancient Greeks knew as *moira*. In addition to the need for social cohesion, this is a valid foundation for the distinctive psychosocial outlook of honor-based societies.

If everyone has to be respected on the basis of merit, so much less the motivation *not* to; accordingly, there is less justification to stir up trouble. The motto, 'Do what you can for your society' is secondary and consequent to, 'Do what diverts any disposition to large-scale mischief.' As against this standard, dignity-based societies have a mythos incontestably opposed, entirely favoring the individual *qua* individual. Those aware of this nuance in the argument (especially Huntington [42]) are more aware than most that the truest and most relevant upshot of this is the expectation of deep cultural mistrust as between the honor-based and the dignity-based moieties.

The Enlightenment thesis was, despite all of this, completely correct: give people the freedom to be all they can be, and individuals will not only not be more, but will actually be *less* encouraged to upset social institutions. Counter-intuitive or not, *that* mythos has less to do with individualism or collectivism *per se*, and more to do with the *dignity* of individuals versus the socially accepted methods of maintaining individual *honor* for the sake of group harmony. Dignity and honor, not the individual or collectivity, constitute the correct 'parent' binary.

THE THEORY OF CULTS AND OFFICES

Overview

For any other than the very simplest of social groups, some means must be devised to categorize generalized mass drift phenomena that offer prospects of yielding statistically valid metrics. This begins with theory, translates to methodology, and then to empirical verification. Figure (3) is the result.

A 30-mile high overview might start something like this: Worth reflected and expressed through meritorious efforts presupposes that H-B people couch worth and merit together as follows: 1) a *responsibility* to be successful; 2) *prerogative* announcing felt worth and the expectancy of respect, taking for granted that one's words and deeds are normative, and 3) accept the obligation and exposure entailed in *representing* one's local groups, as if by homage and fealty to honor, e.g., its protection and avenging. The D-B equivalent is to couch acceptance and authority together (will, power and obligation [=authority] incorporate Table (3) values of *inherent* regard for dignity and *faith* in others to respect it) as follows: 1) the will to reflect dignity in one's words and deeds; 2) the obligation to protect society from those disaccepting dignity and 3) the personal and social muscle to prevent or limit negative tendencies that promise what is normative but which are in reality self-serving.

Prevalence of Cultural Types

Figure 3.

H-B	C-H	C-D	D-B
4	2-3	5	1-2
Merited worth	Social responsibility	Façade of goodness	Inherent worth
Respect	*Sine qua non* work	Do because one can	Acceptance
Trustworthiness	Fount of ethics	Immoral seen as moral	Faith in others

The *piece de resistance* in the figure comes in elaborating the import of the numbers under the headings. Scoring from 1 to 5 records the least to most prevalent configuration. The least prevalent goes to the D-B designation, the *nominal* dignity-based ('nominal' by defining standards, not evident behavioral norms). We should want to define cultural types by the influence of law and religion on the way society directs its moral compass (business, professions, politics, etc.). Americans have a system whose ideals in law and religion are centered on authority in each individual as granted in the constitutional documents.

The H-B take a sense of prerogative from perceived cultural allowance; it cannot be overstated that the 'quiet' H-B would rather maintain order than permit the assumed propensity of tall egos to become powerful and, willingly or otherwise, negotiate destruction. The 'loud' honor-based groups, in common with the D-B, are more tolerant of increased individual power at the top, as witness the Caudillo pattern throughout the historical Latin America and the tendency of modern H-B societies to permit authoritarianism.

The upshot is that a true D-B society is relatively easy to talk about, less easy to understand

from a conceptual vantage, and not at all easy for its membership to 'walk the walk'; Americans are a classic example of the type. Given these observations it is not beside the point to ask what percentage of the world's population entertains this label. It isn't much. Adding transitional countries to nominal listings this number is a theoretical maximum of perhaps 15%. More important is gauging the influence of the philosophy behind the dignity-based concept and how well it is being put into practice – the 'observed' as opposed to 'designated' indicators.

Accordingly, we break down the D-B cognate into four subgroups: 1) near to nominal but advancing; 2) nominal; 3) near normative; 4) normative. Clearly these are not just observational but are also impressionable, and the first impression should be this: it is not easy to be a normative dignity-based country. That said, the world has a lot of work to do on this head (for those who agree with the dignity thesis, and of course many do not).

Somewhat more prevalent than the D-B are the honor cults. They would be far more common were it not for the tendency for them to degrade into dignity cults. These cults spontaneously sprang up everywhere in the ancient world, from age-groups in traditional societies to warrior societies and on up the ladder of breadth and depth. We are mainly interested in those serving a widespread social need, as occurred in all the ancient civilizations and in many societies prior to that time.

In the honor cult we have on display the highest ideals of character and performance that an aristocratic temperament could hope to offer the general populace. Giving trusted and admired leaders the power to solve problems is what the H-B groups best learned how to do in their experience with tribal methods and in so doing birthed offices and stewardship in the form of these honor-cults.

The next configuration in order of prevalence is the garden variety H-B society. It is half-way between the basic D-B unit and its cult, and is the original source both of honor and dignity cults. Wags have defined Civilization as the result of Hobbesian nature rendered effete and ineffectual as higher morals display the credentials necessary to displace the lower. The honor cult institutionalized such moral values and encoded them within the concept of stewardship. But it was the H-B society as a foundation of mores that made all this possible.

The last configuration from Figure (3) is the dignity cult, which is thought to have the highest prevalence across the board. The reason is that it is found in primitive, transitional and modern societies, both honor-based and dignity-based. They play the largest role and control the most social territory in the group of modern cultures. The cult of dignity is not likely anybody's invention or hobbyhorse; it seems rather to be a declination away from an ideal, somewhat along the lines of the Latin noun system. Many have pointed to this as a process that appears inherent. Here is an especially clear example from F.S.C. Schiller [43]:

All human institutions have a way of growing into perversions of their original purpose that block its attainment…. Those who run the institutions are allowed to acquire interests that conflict with the professed purpose of the institutions they serve.

A few brave souls working behind the protective outer garments of tenure and repute have occasionally but carefully flayed open academe. The pinnacle of the honor cult should by reason be found where most critical, in the research environments that all others must rely on. The dignity cult, if the above explanation be justified at all, should confirm the account given. Boguslaw [44] (1968: 59-60) illustrates how modern American research labs and institutes fit

the pattern of declination from C-H to C-D. He begins, in Figure (4), with a four-part recitation of the 'classic' scientific values – the idealized cult of honor approach, based largely on Merton [45] and Storer [46]. He then proceeds to characterize what he takes to be prevailing norms, paralleling them against the previous four as if to generate his own four 'dimensions' – these latter the very epitome of a cult of dignity.

Fig. 4.

cult of honor	*cult of dignity*
1) *Universalism* – objectivity reigns over personal aspiration;	1) *Particularism* – "[He who] proved the superiority of…a rival research society would rapidly find himself ostracized…
2) *Communality* – collaborative endeavors where "reward for… achievement should be restricted to recognition and esteem"	2) *Miserism* – "[It is] necessary to be a miser and hoard one's own findings to prevent use by rivals
3) *Disinterestedness* – no explanation required	3) *Interestedness* – "Or, 'Are you kidding?'
4) *Organized skepticism* – each scientist held responsible for self- and other-accountability best described as traitorous"	4) *Organized dogmatism* – "Above all, one must not raise significant questions about previous [in-house] research... it is behavior
(a)	**(b)**

Offices and Stewardship

The cults of honor and dignity follow upon the two fundamental variations in its meaning. Cults of either type are slivers or chips off of a larger social entity, tending to magnify their own value or even claim for themselves all the benefits of the parent traditions of which they are a reflection. More particularly, the cult is a society within a society, a class of people who individually and collectively propose to both espouse and deliver aspects of honor or dignity that would not otherwise reach the larger community.

This requires the institution of the office, defined for our purposes as a platform for the exercise of a grant of authority enabling and legitimating the concentration power and/or resources in officers to the end that socially valued objectives are institutionalized. The stewardship of the office ensures the quality of work necessary and the proactive efforts to prevent proper resources being put to improper uses. Because of top-heavy power in a small group it is possible, absent stewardship, for their pretensions to become extreme or even bogus, as when claiming as many benefits as possible for themselves rather than working to spread them about. Fundamentally, then, this cult is disposed to hypocrisy. This is the dignity cult – 'our dignity is better than your dignity'.

What makes for a cult of honor is in part where it comes from but chiefly what it is and does. We call it a cult of honor because it is an honor-based principle that gives the cult its character. It is the honor-based groups who first saw fit to institutionalize it and it is the honor-based groups who have often done the most to keep it alive. And of course, given that we are all born honor-based, there will always exist honor-based principles in every dignity-based society just as there are dignity-based elements in every honor-based society.

The most relevant honor-based principle responsible for honor cults appears to us to be the felt need to retain "esteem" for principles whose outward workings bring satisfaction, pride and honor to society. By this criterion a group of chess masters or a ballet troupe will be examples of Russian honor cults. When foreigners remark that America lacks culture, one wonders if part of this isn't because we do not create honor cults from our favorite pastimes (golf comes close, though we do manage the occasional personality cult). This is not to suggest that there is no true culture, though it does suggest that we seem not to appreciate and nourish culture to the same extent, and certainly not in the same way, as many other peoples. That should give us pause; not to up and change colors, but to *think* about what we do and don't do, what we do and don't *praise*.

Both cults are intimately related to social class, where 'class' can be a philosophical equivalent of the "set" in mathematics, in which case it should be known as a "descriptive" class—such as, for example, the 'wealthy', or the 'blacks'. But considering class as a social phenomenon suggests that we add specifically social attributes bespeaking ideas translated into common, identifiable and consistent conduct. The moneyed and propertied set (a descriptive class), in order to be an example of a cult of dignity, will be distinguished largely by its social attributes: the de facto membership (they usually needn't apply to qualify) has operated individually and collectively to accomplish what preserves and promotes the class privileges, often and notably in violation of stated objectives.

Suppose that the same descriptive class of moneyed and propertied folk were instead declared to be an honor cult. They would constitute a group that felt that their power and privilege, while useful, should be held accountable, that their conduct should meet certain standards. Such a group would be redolent of an ideal form of aristocracy. Similarly, patriotic youth submit to drills and a hundred other rigors and learn a style of conduct befitting their military station. As a class it is descriptive (soldiers) and carries social attributes (national pride and patriotism).

It is reasonable, as an aside, to inquire why there is not a dignity-based equivalent of the honor cult (it would be the established social motivation, not a cult) or why, on the other hand, there is not an honor-based equivalent of what I have styled the cult of dignity (it *is* the 'dignity cult'). Why are dignity cults found in honor-based moieties and honor cults in dignity-based moieties? In developing this system there were a few self-imposed rules. One of them was to avoid pointless replication or needless duplication; another was to label a thing for what it was, is and will be. While arbitrary, I believe these rules serve the needs of intellectual honesty. The cults of honor and dignity are what they are, and are properly labeled given their nature and character. If they appear in several styles of governance or in both typologies, so be it; they are what they are, and wherever they are, they go by their given names as here defined, however obtuse that may cause them to appear in a given application.

While offices are universally observed, they are differently applied, being an opportunity for a *service* to the community in the dignity-based moiety, whereas the honor-based societies most

often permit it as a *reward* and grant immunities from stewardship requirements that otherwise forbid gratuitous exactions. In the D-B groups a failure to establish and enforce stewardship controls on quality and safety resulted in the 2008 financial disaster, for example. The H-B societies, renowned for corruption, utilize their offices as intermediaries in their own destructive habits. It is stewardship that deconstructs the dignity cult back into the honor cult.

State-based governments are collections of offices; thus, a cult of dignity can easily enough be the result of a strong leader (and/or of advisors themselves at the helm of offices) with the appropriate mindset, as for example this, from the period of Chinese legalism (Graeber, 2011: 240):

Shang was harsher than most of his fellow legalists in that he believed that widespread prosperity would ultimately harm the ruler's ability to mobilize his people for war, and therefore terror was the most efficient instrument of governance, but even he insisted that this regime be clothed as a regime of law and justice. [47]

The cult needn't be anywhere near this oppressive, but the use of the office to convert normative ends (in part or whole) into personal or party ends while putting off a smiling philosophy of egality is the required aptitude.

CONCLUSION

The ideals of honor and dignity are essentially the same, the difference being in how they are evaluated and carried out. Classical H-B societies required safety and security above all else. In general, freedom from want was a social ideal. This reflected the struggle for existence. Today, this is not the force it once was. Modern H-B societies generally provide government services simply on the basis of the traditional influence of prior institutional norms originating in the 'struggle' against nature. What has not changed as much as we might like to think is the 'us v. them' attitude, and a tendency toward ultranationalist leanings with strongarm leaders even when democratically elected (or despite that fact in many instances). Classical social ideas defend and promote these influences in most cases.

The dignity-based cultures, with the exception of England and Rome, emerged from the Enlightenment era with a man-made ideal of inmost deservedness of each person for protection and the satisfaction of basic wants. These ideals are prevented by intervening cults of dignity that serve themselves and utilize the power of institutions to their ends. It is the powerful defenders of such cults that constitute the so-called 'deep state' if there be one in these societies. It is not without interest that even in the United States, whose mythic ideals are of all the most idealistic and equalitarian, the populace has recently elected a business man who far more resembles the modern honor-based strong-arm leader. The cult of dignity is difficult to break out from. A true dignity-based society is very difficult to attain, still more difficult to maintain, one would suppose. Cults of dignity attract the movers-and-shakers and those whose principles stress categorical rights of individual gain, as against fulfilling offices meant to serve all equally.

Cults of honor, on the other hand, attract perfectionists, patriots, as well as those who are 'climbers', 'go-getters', folks on the move upward. In short, where success is at once the credential to play and the objective to slay (be that as it may), we are going to find perhaps 10-15 percent with 'bipolar personalities', as indeed has always been the case here and abroad;

but especially in America, where there are so few lets or hindrances to the excesses that such top-heavy offices beget. Power, wealth and notability are powerful lures to this group.

By way of fairness and completeness, it must be established just what the collage of hypomanic traits amounts to in the social setting. We have painted them as uniformly bad, which is not at all the case. In point of simple fact, these traits express personalities that have given us the vast majority of inventions, works of art and all manner of advances, scientific or otherwise. To say that this group is the 'go-getter' subset of a population is no exaggeration. The problem is simply that the good traits become magically matched first with questionable, later with bad ones, as the number and expressiveness of the traits increases. A faithful and more exhaustive treatment of these same points is found in Jamison [48. 49].

In normal this is a very occasional and short-lived phenomenon; in the bipolar personality we see a good many of the good and learn to presume some of the bad (they are comparatively easy to hide from the public gaze); and in illness the bad actually overtake the personality. Some percentage of 'hypomanic' personalities will ultimately develop the full bipolar illness. One can reasonably reckon the prevalence of the 'personality' level at perhaps 5-6 percent of the population and the ill about 3-4 percent given that hypomanic complexes are underdiagnosed.

At any rate, we are speaking of the 'loud' types often with more than two divorces on their resumé. They are exuberant and indefatigable. They can and will be undeniably charming; they will be the life of the party. They tend to be micro-managers, the women helicopter moms. Together they are responsible for risk-friendly practices, rushing contracts, offering bait-and-switch to employees and customers alike. They suit themselves more than suiting others. Cross them and you will discover they can be excessively vengeful. Observe, however, that these are necessarily gross generalities, there being in reality an amazing variation in kinds and expressiveness of traits, making the type as difficult to discern as to describe (even for doctors).

To become so self-important that obligations become mere lip service is to presume to a dignity not otherwise accepted or expected of others outside the cult. But it may also be a reason why the me-me-me traits exist in such prevalence in these times, and why a politician may unwittingly, just by his own personality, capture that style and mistreat offices as expected. This problem exists throughout both H-B and D-B societies but it creates the greatest malaise in the latter. We close with a commentary on Socrates germane to stewardship. The following is from Nichols [50] (1987: 136); in brackets are stewardship substitutions in light of the honor-dignity binary.

The unjust soul cannot be happy, Socrates concludes, because in it the many-headed beast [cult of dignity membership] runs riot. Socrates leaves to implication the happiness of the just man [steward], the human being 'in control', 'nourishing and cultivating the tame heads [duties 'to' the office in the honor cult] while hindering the growth of the savage ones [proactive prevention of dysfunction]' and 'making the lion's nature [concentrated power in the hands of the officeholder] an ally' (589 a-b from *The Republic*).

Today's H-B peoples need to heed this lesson; the D-B of any period need to start taking it seriously. These two mindsets are of course cultural artifacts and obey the rules of culture. We can with good evidence speak of a mass drift over long periods of time toward dignity-based culture. To that extent we might take note of Kroeber's [51] remark: "We know of pieces of history that show the change; our own American contemporary history is impressively so

oriented; and over the total range of human culture the net drift is perhaps to the same effect. But the trend is not universal and is not irreversible."

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