THE EFFICACY OF FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR PEACE MISSIONS UNDER THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE (APSA)

Bitiyong Zemo J. Amina[1] and Sheriff Ghali Ibrahim[2]

[1]Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Abuja-Nigeria
[2]Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Abuja

ABSTRACT: *The paper delves into the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) as established in 2003, within the framework of implementing the AU's plan for the management of crises and conflicts on the continent. It also analyses the efficacy of financial arrangements for peace missions under APSA. The paper depends on secondary methodology, which remains historical-descriptive in nature. Findings show that, language is one of the barriers to communication among the countries that offer their troops for peacekeeping missions and this can serve as an added funding cost in terms of both time and money in training and integrating military forces of various languages. On the deployment of African Mission in Burundi in 2003 (AMIB) for example, the estimated budget was US$110 million for the initial year. The actual expenditure at the end of the year turned out to be US $134 million. The AU in the absence of adequate funds in its Peace Fund expected to raise the money from donations and pledges. Only US $50 million could be raised. The paper concludes that a united and capable Africa is what regional and international players want. It is therefore essential for African states to demonstrate sufficient political will, capacity and buy-in, which will instill the confidence necessary to galvanize support for its operations and improve funding. The paper recommends a deliberate effort by African heads of states and governments in an improved collective quest for regional and continental security as opposed to the pursuit of wholly national agendas and interests.*

KEYWORDS: Efficacy, Financial Arrangements, Peace Mission, African Union

INTRODUCTION

The African Union (AU) transited from the ashes of the now defunct Organization of Africa Unity (OAU). Thirty-two independent African Nations had set out on May 25th, 1963 to collectively achieve independence for all other African nations from the clutches of colonialism and in the process promote African unity (AU Charter). When all 53 African nations had attained their independence the purpose and objective of the OAU had run its course by the year 2002 leading to the creation of the AU with South Sudan joining in 2011, bringing its membership to 54 countries (Williams, 2009).

Over the years, Africans have propounded an Afrocentric foreign policy, their often-echoed mantra being "African Solutions to African Problems" (ASAP) so it has behooved on the continent to back their words with action. In the course of operating the constitution of the OAU it was discovered that a primary shortcoming was the lack of provisions relating to the prevention of, or a more robust determination of conflicts, an irony for a continent riddled

with more than the world's fair share of wars and conflicts. The OAU had as one of its cardinal objectives safeguarding the territorial integrity and sovereignty of its member states. In recognizing the sovereignty of its member states it adopted the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of its members outlined in the OAU Charter, article 3 (1 – 4) (Kent and Malan, 2003).

During the operation of the OAU it was observed that it was necessary to amend the framework to stand up to armed non-state actors when the host government's security forces prove inadequate (Williams, 2014). In the execution of this new principle of "non-indifference" the AU has adopted a more robust approach to peacekeeping falling on the post-Westphalian philosophy propounded by Tony Blair's doctrine (Williams 2014) of the "international community" whereby there is a "responsibility to deal with human suffering wherever it occurs" the justification being that globalization had made this necessary. It was also the view of the AU that although Article 2 of the United Nations' Charter calls on member states to refrain in their international relations from resorting to the use of threats of force either against the territorial integrity or the independence of all States in any manner that is incompatible with the aims of the United Nations or from interfering in the internal affairs of other States they were "convinced that economic progress cannot be achieved unless conditions for the necessary security are ensured in all member states of the community" (Williams 2014). This was ensconced in Article 4 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union that gives the "right to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity" (Williams, 2009).

LITERATURE REVIEW

The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is the framework for the implementation of the AU's plan for the management of crises and conflicts on the continent. It came in force in 2003. It lays down the structures and responsibilities of the different sections that make up the APSA. APSA is composed of the Peace and Security Council, which is supported by the Commission, the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System, the African Standby Force and the Peace Fund. The AU has found it necessary, based on chapter VIII of the UN Charter and especially under the provisions of article 53 that requires United Nations Security Council authorization to undertake regional peace missions (Cilliers, 2005).

The APSA was set up on the premise that "the security, stability and development of every African country are inseparably linked with those of other African countries. Consequently, instability in one African country reduces the stability of all other countries" especially in the regional economic community (RECs) where the conflict is taking place (Williams, 2009). It is important to note that the AU recognizes five regional organizations on the continent which play a key role in the maintenance of peacekeeping operations on the African continent namely the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS), the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). These organizations make contributions to the AU from time to time as part of the

body for peacekeeping but there is usually a shortfall necessitating the need for support from the United Nations and voluntary contributions from other donor nations (Cilliers, 2005).

Several reports and academic research have highlighted the need for the strengthening and expansion of the role that regional organizations like the AU play in the prevention of conflict and in peace operations. This involves an examination of the capacity, constraints and the ability of these organizations to responsibly take on the role (Cilliers, 2005). While the AU seeks to play a greater role in ensuring peace and security on the continent a major incapacity has been financial constraints. The AU has no permanent budget. Only 2.3% of the AU's budget comes from AU member states (Williams, CFR Report 2011) through funding by the RECs. This seriously undermines the rhetoric as to the AU's desires to be masters of their own destinies.

As stated by Renwick (2013), "The lack of indigenous sources of finance also undermines the AU's credibility as a leading player in peace and security issues on the continent and reduces its ability to exercise ownership of particular initiatives". In an official report commissioned by the AU's Peace and Security Department (Jeng, 2012) the issue of sustainability featured prominently primarily on the account of the fact that the implementation of the APSA has been largely dependent on partner support. This approach raises questions as to the sustainability, predictability, flexibility" (Giorgis, 2010) of AU peace operations.

Funding of these missions, for instance, contributions to the African Standby Force (ASF) is borne by the parent member AU State with the AU handling mission subsistence, travel and other allowances (Kent and Malan, 2003). The argument has been raised that the decision to send forces on a peacekeeping operation is based on the politics of the dominant member states and this directly affects decisions made as the popular saying goes…'he who pays the piper dictates the tune'. Therefore, the independence of such international institutions from the influence of its dominant member states is still a hot debate among scholars (Kent and Malan, 2003). According to Bachmann (2011), "the French, United Kingdom and Belgian approaches are remnants of their colonial legacies; in the Japanese the country's economic interests; in Canadian the influences of the Commonwealth and Francophone countries; in German, a degree of guilt complex mixed with angst about potential African immigration". It is clear that the absence of a regular, central funding and reimbursement mechanism for peacekeeping operations would inhibit the ability of financially poorer states to participate meaningfully in the peacekeeping process.

The budget of the AU Commission increased to USD$138 million in 2005 broken down into USD$75 million for peace and security and USD$63 million for administrative costs. The source of funding at this time was projected to be from AU member states (contributing USD$63 million) and the balance USD$75 million from donors and discretionary payments from individual member AU states (Cilliers, 2005). The AU made a proposal to the European Union (EU) to establish a Peace Facility mandated with the task of funding peacekeeping operations and support in Africa, but under the control of the AU. Due to the fact that the contribution to this initiative would be from EU member states, the challenges this proposal faced was that ultimately the control of each individual peacekeeping operation or commitment would be decided by the EU Commission in Brussels and not the AU office in Addis Ababa. Thus, decision making for the initiative would lie with the EU although the Commission committed to follow the lead and advise of the AU in arriving at its decisions (Cilliers, 2005).

The Peace and Security Council is one of the organs of the African Union and utilizes the African Standby Force (ASF) for its missions in peacebuilding and peacekeeping (Kent and Malan, 2010). The ASF is tasked with the composition of contingents of civilian and military forces from various countries in the AU and are ready to deploy at a moment's notice (Felman, 2008).

According to Feldman (2008), language is one of the barriers to communication among the countries that offer their troops for peacekeeping missions and this can serve as an added funding cost in terms of both time and money in training and integrating military forces of various languages. On the deployment of African Mission in Burundi in 2003 (AMIB) the estimated budget was US$110 million for the initial year. The actual expenditure at the end of the year turned out to be US $134 million. The AU in the absence of adequate funds in its Peace Fund expected to raise the money from donations and pledges. Only US $50 million could be raised (Rodt, 2012).

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

Despite a decade of robust African economic growth, the AU still depends on external sources for more than 90 percent of its budget (Allen and Yuen, 2014). "Few African countries are capable of deploying a battalion or more for peace operations without significant assistance. In addition, most do not possess specialized units with sufficient equipment or expertise to provide such necessary services as engineering, communications, medical or movement control (Giorgis, 2010). Often, Memoranda of Understanding between the troop contributing countries requires them to be self-sustaining for at least 60 days after which the AU Commission is expected to reimburse them. Very few African countries have this capability.

The funding of the Peace Fund for conflict-related activities has come mainly from donors and members. This is against a backdrop of a litany of unpaid obligations and membership dues by members. However, the budget for some peacekeeping operations seems to be above the capacity of member states to fund. A good example is the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) with an annual budget of US$1 billion (Cillers, 2005).

Williams (2014) also states in the CFR report, that the US plays the role of the largest donor to the United nations and African Union peace keeping operations in Africa. This is achieved by both voluntary contributions to Au and also directly supporting nations partaking in peace operations. He suggests, establishing a new, predictable funding mechanism that supports the AU directly – an equivalent to the EU's African Peace Facility that provides financial support for the EU's joint strategy with the AU.

RECOMMENDATIONS

One of the initial attempts to address this funding gap was the establishment of a Peace Fund by the Organization of African Unity (now AU) in the early 1990's. The fund still exists today and is funded by deductions from the AU annual budget of 6 per cent and also supported by voluntary contributions from member states and donors. There have been

several recommendations made by the AU in order to boost its financial resources. These include;

i. A peace tax on African citizens. Some RECs such as ECOWAS have put in place their own resource mobilization strategy from its members. Namely, a Community Levy a percentage of which is dedicated to the ECOWAS Peace Fund.

ii. Initiating a pan – African visa wherein visitors to the continent are made to pay $10.00.

iii. The inclusion of a percentage of the profits of insurance firms and other blue chip companies, on concerts and entertainment initiatives and a first charge on death duties from a certain income bracket.

iv. Individual donations and fund raising activities for the Peace Fund. The AU should establish strong resource mobilization strategies for the Peace Fund. Such a structure would ensure that resource mobilization is undertaken on a more structured and consistent scale. (Kent and Malan, 2003).

v. Formalization of firm funding agreements with the UN and international community especially with a scheme for funding-with-reimbursements.

vi. Enhanced political will - Despite the knowledge that adequate and consistent contributions are necessary from AU member states to the Peace Fund only a few countries are faithful in making these contributions and they do not do so in full or regularly. Cilliers (2005) points out that in the AU Summit in Libya in 2005, South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt, Algeria, and Libya contributed 15 per cent of the of the annual budget of the AU, while the other 48 member states funded the outstanding 25%. African countries must stop playing lip-service to their commitment to peace and security on the continent by backing their words with action and this by way of their taking seriously their financial obligations to the AU.

vii. Total eradication of corruption - The main bane of the lack of prosperity on the African continent, which further translates to inability to meet legitimate financial obligations, is corruption. There is a need to plug all forms of income leakage by waging an all-out war on corruption. Most African countries, if not all, are plagued by leaders who are sit-tight, corrupt and undemocratic. The inability to institutionalize the necessary checks and balances in government result in a profligate lifestyle among the ruling class.

viii. Further restructure of APSA - Priority needs to be given to the prevention of conflicts and not the resolution of conflicts. This can be achieved by further restructuring of APSA in a manner that empowers it to trigger its Early Warning Mechanism in a timely manner; not wait for the escalation of conflict to the point of conflagration before wading in with a bid to resolution.

Burundi as a Case Study

It should be stressed that the cost of maintaining African peacekeeping operations on the continent far outweighs the contributions of member states and a lot of the funding is from the international donor community (Cilliers, 2005). A good case attesting to this fact can be

seen when considering the African Peacekeeping mission in Burundi in the 1990s. This was the initial forage of the AU into peace missions. The initial plan was to send in a 5,000-man strong peacekeeping force but this met with President Pierre Nkurunziza's opposition. Without his consent this action would have infringed on Burundi's sovereignty. The AU finally negotiated to send 100 human rights observers along with 100 military observers. Jeng (2012), states that AU's weaknesses especially regarding its member states' abilities was evident in the Burundi situation. Observers may play a useful role in preventing crises from going worse, but this particular case revealed the limitation of AU to respond to a crisis on its continent. A tough resolution on action towards Burundi would have set a clear precedent and a message that the African Union is committed to protect the population of nations if the state fails to protect its citizens, this would also have resulted in stronger support from the international bodies like the UN.

The operational costs of as few as 67 military observers in Burundi (OMIB) in the period 1993 – 1996 was about $7.2 million while in the same period the contributions of African countries to the Peace Fund was approximately $5 million with the international donor community making donations totaling about $6.5million. As a result of the enormous costs involved in funding peacekeeping on the continent, the extent of funding that the AU can afford is still limited severely to observer missions with much larger missions such as the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) which is projected to cost USD$1 billion beyond the funding capacity of the commission (Allen and Yuen, 2014).

According to Cilliers (2005), the options left to fund peace operations could then be distilled down to measures based on practicality of the proposed solutions. Based on UN reports, full scale funding of regional peace operations could be undertaken upon approval of the UN Security Council. The regional organization to benefit would have to establish appropriate frameworks for necessary budgetary and financial accountability oversight functions and defend same before the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations before funding is approved. Other measures may include the following:

i.   Voluntary contributions from international organizations through various means not limited to mutual agreements for special trust funds for the purpose. ECOWAS has an arrangement currently in place in West Africa.

ii.   Direct support from multilateral organizations like the EU to the AU or similar regional organizations. An example of this would be the Peace Fund as earlier mentioned.

iii. Some countries make bilateral arrangements allowing for contribution towards a particular mission. It is not uncommon for such donor countries to have particular interests in the countries they support in the peace initiatives. A good case in point here is the US contribution to the AU for the peace operation in Sudan, the African Union Mission in Sudan II (AMIS II) and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).

iv.   Member states of regional organizations can undertake the funding of specific regional missions. This option is however fraught with challenges as most African regional organizations are severely constrained in their ability to deploy anything

more than symbolic peace missions in Africa that at best have observer status due to their paltry financial resources.

v.   A novel approach would be to require a percentage of remittances made by Africans in Diaspora (not more than 2%) to be garnered from each transaction.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A united and capable Africa is what regional and international players want. It is essential for African states to demonstrate sufficient political will, capacity and buy-in, which will instill the confidence necessary to galvanize support for its operations and improve funding. This will require a deliberate effort by African heads of states and governments in an improved collective quest for regional and continental security as opposed to the pursuit of wholly national agendas and interests (Kent and Malan, 2003).

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