



THE OBAMA'S RED LINE AND SUBSEQUENT U.S. MISSILES ATTACK ON SYRIAN MILITARY BASES: IMPACT ON WORLD POLITICS

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ABSTRACT: *The paper examines the Obama's red-line on Syria and analyses the American attacks on Syrian military bases. Using the library research from secondary historical-descriptive approach, findings show that, the missile attacks were carried out to compliment Obama's failure to attack Syria after the use of chemical weapon by the regime of Bashir Al-Assad. The paper concludes that the Obama Red line has portrayed the inherent feature of the democrats as they oppose wars and see it as a last resort. The red line was issued as a warning, a caveat and to threaten the Syrian government not to ever apply chemical weapon on its citizens, not because Obama wanted to deploy men in boot on Syrian soil. It was also responsive as Assad under the guide of Russia agreed for the destruction of the Syrian chemical stockpiles, which eased the tension between the United States and Syria. The paper recommends among other things that, the United States should not with any state continue to support terrorist groups such as Alqaeda in fighting anywhere in the world. The world must also put a stop to Saudi-Arabia's funding of such extremist groups within the Middle East and other regions around the world and states should not be allowed to be making use of weapons of mass destruction, as it goes contrary to the international law*

KEYWORDS: Obama, Red-Line, Syria, Missiles-Attack, Military-Base, Impact

INTRODUCTION

The Syrian crisis or civil war as envisaged in the international system today was one among many upheavals that engulfed the Arab world region five years ago. Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria have long gone passed that stage with processing of rehabilitation, reshuffling and reintegration of the diverse warring faction and re-establishing the displaced and reconstructing the diverse high levels of destructions that has taken place. The Syrian government has failed to find lasting solutions to these civil crises, unrest in its domain thereby leading to a very high loss in lives, properties and even impacting hugely on the political system of the world at large. The subsequent usage of chemical weapon by Assad has had the world criticizing such actions especially in a scenario where there is stipulation on the types of light weapon that should be used by Nations States in addressing wars either on an internal level or on an international level.

This paper seeks to discuss the relevant steps taken by Obama's administration toward annihilating the actions and inactions of the Syrian government towards it people and the rebels in its territory and the re-emergence or pushing of the red lines action by Trump in fighting the act of genocide by the Assad led Syrian government.



LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Research is a strong means to finding means and solutions to issues bordering the society at any level. They are pointers to knowing the pros and cons in issues, cases associated to inherent happenings in any polity. And an academic research is not complete without the application of a theoretical basis to guide the researcher and the subsequent reader towards having a cogent understanding of what is being analyzed. Obasi (1999), states that a theory sets out the interrelationships among groups of variables, and then finally explains and predicts the phenomena. Theory functions as compass and fence directing and delineating the course of a research according to already discovered and established body of knowledge, ideas and generalizations. In view of the importance of theory, Power theory will serve as a good basis for analyzing U.S. role in the Syrian crisis that lingered over the years.

Power as a goal in international relations belongs to political theorists, such as Niccolò Machiavelli and Hans Morgenthau. Especially among Classical Realist thinkers, power is an inherent goal of mankind and of States. Power is a complex and contested concept, in large part because there are important but distinctive ways to understand how social relations shape the fates and choices of actors. When thinking about a state's ability to shape other States' and Non-states' behavior, what we are really thinking about is what are the capabilities of a state that can give them the ability to change or alter others' behaviors.

Viotti and Kauppi (2013) see Capabilities as "material and nonmaterial resources that can serve as the basis for power." Capabilities are important as they allow a state the ability to be influential in international relations with other State and Non-state actors. In a similar fashion, Non-state actors also have varied power capabilities. Regardless how much time leaders spend thinking about goals, strategies, or policy objectives, there must be a need for power in order to make these goals a reality (Viotti & Kauppi, 2013).

As Viotti & Kauppi (2013) explain, "Power is essentially a means; even if its enhancement is pursued as an end, the State does so instrumentally as a means to enable or facilitate its attainments of other ends." In a nutshell, the application or the subsequent attack on the Syrian government by the Trump lead administration in U.S. not allow driven by the genocide happening in the Syrian territory but that U.S. is also trying to protect its power politics in the world at large thereby reminding the world of their capabilities at influence their unipolar strong holds anywhere in the world especially in developing and underdeveloped countries that can neither match their political, economic power nor their military prowess.

The Obama Red Line on Syria

The use of chemical weapons by Syrian forces would be crossing a "red line" requiring American military intervention, President Barack Obama declared in 2012. A year later, Syrian President Bashar Assad did just that, firing rockets filled with sarin gas into towns around Damascus, killing an estimated 1,400 civilians. Obama delivered a nationally televised address on Sept. 10, 2013, making a passionate and cogent argument for why U.S. intervention would be in the best interest of the Nation and the World.



If we fail to act, the Assad regime will see no reason to stop using chemical weapons. As the ban against these weapons erodes, other tyrants will have no reason to think twice about acquiring poison gas and using them. Over time, our troops would again face the prospect of chemical weapons on the battlefield. And it could be easier for terrorist organizations to obtain these weapons, and use them to attack civilians.

But there was little enthusiasm in the U.S. Congress for action, so Obama quietly backed down from his threat and punted the solution to the Russians, who were all-too-willing to flex their power-brokering influence in the Middle East. Syria agreed to dismantle its chemical weapons stockpiles, the Russians said, in exchange for escaping punishment for its war crimes." Assad gave up his chemical weapons," Obama told the American public in May 2015. "That's not speculation on our part. That, in fact, has been confirmed by the organization internationally that is charged with eliminating chemical weapons." In January 2016, former National Security Adviser Susan Rice boasted about how the administration's decision to step back from the red line was actually a great success.

We were able to find a solution that didn't necessitate the use of force that actually removed the chemical weapons that were known from Syria, in a way that the use of force would never have accomplished," she said. "Our aim in contemplating the use of force following the use of chemical weapons in August of 2013 was not to intervene in the civil war, not to become involved in the combat between Assad and the opposition, but to deal with the threat of chemical weapons by virtue of the diplomacy that we did with Russia and with the Security Council. We were able to get the Syrian government to voluntarily and verifiably give up its chemical weapons stockpile (Rice, 2016).

It is notable that confusion over whether weapons of mass destruction exist in foreign countries is not unique to any particular presidential administration. We know that at least 75 people were killed in northern Syria on April 4 after being exposed to a toxic gas that survivors said was dropped from airplanes, and U.S. officials have told several news outlets that there is evidence that the Russians knew about the attack in advance and did nothing to stop it. President Donald Trump ordered a cruise-missile strike against a Syrian air base in response to the chemical attack, setting off a debate that has scrambled opposing camps. But the truth is that Obama's argument for military intervention was sound in 2013. American interests are served by stopping tyrants from using chemical weapons even in wars that don't directly involve us. Obama's faint-hearted failure at the red line helped unleash the immigration crisis in Europe, emboldened the Russians in their quest to re-establish their power around the world, and has left open the greater possibility of terrorists getting their hands-on chemical weapons (Alvin, 2016).

Barack Obama liked diplomacy so much, he made Power his foreign policy tutor when he was still a senator. He brought her to his White House after he won the presidency and made her his ambassador to the United Nations in his second term. In a cruel irony, Power's warnings were ignored by her former pupil when Syria's dictator, Bashar al-Assad, slaughtered hundreds of thousands of his own citizens but she remained in her job and still gave powerful speeches. However, on the inside she pressed the president to do something about the mass killings, but Obama declined. He never enforced the "red line" he articulated in 2012, on chemical weapons in Syria. This Trump did in March 2017. He ordered 59



Tomahawk missiles to be launched at the Al-Shayrat airfield in Syria, the base from where Syria launched a horrific sarin gas attack. It's significant that Trump changed his views quickly on Syria following the gas attack. Early reports are that some aircraft and runways were destroyed, but for now this act is mainly symbolic; it sends a message but won't change much on the battlefield (Alvin, 2016).

In the 1990s this kind of thing was known as "cruise missile diplomacy." After al-Qaeda brought down two U.S. embassies in Africa, Clinton launched missiles at training camps in Afghanistan and a pharmaceutical factory in Sudan. He launched the missiles against Saddam Hussein after the dictator kicked out weapons inspectors. By the end of that decade, and especially after the attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, this tactic became an emblem for ineffective half measures. After eight years of Obama's cruise missile diplomacy looks far more muscular. Obama never attacked the Assad regime, even as it committed atrocities year after year. This is not to say Obama has not intervened in Syria. Beginning in 2014 he began airstrikes against Islamic State targets. He also sent special operations forces to help train up local fighters and armed a largely Kurdish militia to fight against the jihadists (Alvin, 2016).

Obama was not primarily responsible for the people Assad and his enablers Russia and Iran have killed and displaced, however his failure to enforce his warning on chemical weapons weakened the international system. Norms like the prohibition on the use of chemical weapons are not self-enforcing. They require a superpower like America to deter other dictators from future violations. When the U.S. abdicates its responsibility to make good on its red line on chemical weapons, it invites mischief from rogues all over the world. So it's not surprising that China's predations in the South China Sea, Russia's invasion of Ukraine and Iran's meddling in Yemen all happened after Obama punted on the red line in Syria. The fact that Trump responded so quickly to President Bashar al-Assad's latest atrocity is a good first step in restoring deterrence. But it will take more than cruise missile diplomacy to restore the international order that has been collapsing in the Obama years. Trump should plan for something bigger (Malcock (2017).

Why the U.S. did not go to War with Assad

The aftermath of the strikes underscores what was known in 2013 would be true even if Congress had acted quickly to give President Obama the authorization he'd asked for; No single military act could ever solve Syria. The brush back pitch of missile strikes may deter Assad from using chemical weapons again anytime soon, but the rapidity with which the airfield in Homs was reused to kill innocent people by conventional means was a real-time reminder of something the Obama administration both conceded and argued at the time just how ephemeral the results of kinetic action can be.

Regardless of one's view of how the situation was handled it seemed to be on the verge of a punitive strike before congressional opposition and a diplomatic opening instead lead the administration to negotiate a deal with the hope it might rid Syria of chemical weapons. It's useful now to consider the complexities of what happened then, since many of the same ones will face today's decision makers. In some cases, the situation facing the Trump administration is even more complex.



First, then as now, there are no perfect options in Syria. Much can be debated about who was right and who was wrong, who was naive and who was prescient. But the passage of time only makes the Syria options worse and the decisions harder.

Second, if there's going to be a sustained effort whether that means finding the long-term, elusive political solution; better protecting civilians through humanitarian corridors presumably backed up by air protection; or engineering the departure of Assad collaborating with allies is going to be necessary, but inherently uncertain. In 2013, we believed we firmly had the United Kingdom and France by our side when we were on the cusp of military action. When Prime Minister David Cameron suddenly and unexpectedly rushed to force a vote in Parliament, and was promptly defeated, we not only lost a key partner but also saw political leaders at home suddenly remembering Congress's hasty 2002 acquiescence in what became an unwise march to military action in Iraq. Demands thereafter surged for the Obama administration to seek congressional approval for even limited airstrikes. Such actions have surely raised expectations around the world not just those of the remaining, beleaguered Syrian opposition but also those of America's Gulf partners, from the Saudis to the Emiratis, who will now want to see what comes next (Finnemore, 2013).

Third, despite the applause they're now hearing from a diverse group of lawmakers including Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer, House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi, and Senator John McCain, the administration can't count on formal congressional support. As someone who spent more than a decade on the Hill, I must acknowledge regretfully that Congress today doesn't have the ability to act quickly on an event like the chemical attack we've witnessed in Idlib, let alone a bigger strategic issue as complex as Syria. It was learned the hard way. In 2013, voices that had long demanded military action against Assad, like McCain and Senator Lindsey Graham, didn't bring with them any votes in favor of such action in the Senate. Reliably neoconservative voices like Senator Marco Rubio suddenly turned isolationist, unable to support a president of the opposite party. Others still felt the pounding hangover of Iraq and Afghanistan.

In arguing to a divided Congress both that it wouldn't be entering another open-ended conflict in the Middle East, and that airstrikes would hold Assad accountable; Kerry was trying to assure lawmakers that the U.S.S would be doing neither too much nor too little. Many in Congress will now argue that an airstrike is a tactic not a strategy, and they're right but neither is demanding a long-term strategy an excuse not to quickly punish a dictator for violating a 100-year-old prohibition against the use of chemical weapons. Regardless, if Trump now decides to ramp up airstrikes against Assad, he should be prepared to do so as President Clinton did in Bosnia and Kosovo, and as President Obama did against ISIS without authorization from Congress. Many in Congress will privately be grateful (Finnemore, 2013).

Fourth, the battlefield has become dramatically more complex since 2013. The targets of any expanded airstrikes Assad's airfields, top regime assets are likely the same, but four years ago the Russians weren't flying over Syria and Russian personnel weren't on the ground there. When Turkey downed a Russian jet in 2016, it underscored how these developments changed the stakes and heightened the potential for miscommunication or worse. Russia's threat to close the hotline Russia and the U.S. use to prevent accidental collisions between their warplanes in Syria was a reminder that the Russians have leverage they didn't have in 2013. At the same time, reports of ongoing communication between the Russians and Americans



underscore that Russia can compartmentalize on issues where its interests are implicated. Despite all kinds of protestations about everything from Ukraine sanctions to the Magnitsky reports under President Obama, the Russians worked with the Americans cooperatively on the Iranian nuclear issue and Afghanistan. Russia has its own reasons to want to see ISIS defeated.

Fifth, a real political solution in Syria is currently unimaginable and no one has any illusions that a single evening's round of missiles fired would change that. The strike against the Homs airfield made clear that Assad could not use chemical weapons with impunity. That in itself is valuable. Repeated strikes might degrade his ability to further terrorize Syrians. In the longer term, the threat or reality of what we just witnessed could also increase pressure on the Russians, Iranians, and other actors to invigorate diplomacy and see whether it leads somewhere constructive, but there's no guarantee of that. There have always been scenarios one could envision where Russia and Iran and the Gulf states could all protect their interests in a post-Assad Syria that preserves some elements of the state, but for many reasons that's never been the road they've chosen. Russia and Iran don't necessarily respect Assad's judgment and at various times have acknowledged he's a burden, but there's no reason to be overly hopeful that they will do anything but stubbornly back him. If we learned anything in 2013, it's that when the threat or reality of force is on the table, the Russians at least engage in earnest diplomatically (Finnemore, 2013).

U.S. Missile's Attacks on Syria's Military Bases

On Donald Trump's orders, US forces have struck the airfield from which the Syrian military launched chemical weapons attack. The strikes were limited, only 59 Tomahawk missiles were involved, and the US says that 'every precaution was taken to execute this strike with minimal risk to personnel at the airfield' (Yikes, 2017).

It was clear that Trump wanted to send a message that the use of chemical weapons is unacceptable and will have consequences. He was, ironically, enforcing the red line that the Obama administration drew and then refused to enforce. But he was trying to do so in a way that does not drag the US further into the conflict or risk World War Three; note that the Russians were warned about the strikes before they happened so that their forces didn't get caught up in them. The United States has demonstrated clear support for an international norm against the use of chemical weapons, and signaled a cost for future use of such weapons. The Syrians have used such weapons many times without any international repercussions. The strike is a message to Assad and the world that indiscriminate weapons that inevitably kill children and other civilians are not acceptable. It helps undo some of the harm caused by President Obama's last-minute decision to revert to Congress before taking punitive action after Assad clearly crossed the "red line" of using such weapons. Importantly, the president stated that upholding this global norm is of "vital national security," contradicting prior positions posing national interests against international standards. The United States has demonstrated a willingness to use its powerful military might swiftly, forcing the Russians, the Chinese, and other countries to consider the possibility of unpredictable and lethal reactions by the United States. The unilateral use of force shows what the United States might undertake in other situations where vital interests are at stake. The strikes show an inclination to use force in a calibrated way to send a specific signal, surprisingly disciplined for such an undisciplined president and White House. This measure could prove helpful for North Korea (Yikes, 2017).



These minimal strikes are unlikely to dissuade the Assad regime from much more than using chemical weapons again, much less weaken Assad in any strategic sense or bring the war closer to an end. The missile strikes reportedly only took out fuel pumps and structures, deliberately not rendering the runways unusable. The Trump administration signaled to the Russians that some action would occur via “deconfliction” communications. The Trump administration has not shown itself ready to cross the Russians or to inflict any meaningful damage to Assad’s military assets. Even less has it demonstrated a new inclination to develop a broader strategy to bring out a stable, peaceful Syria in the future (Yikes, 2017).

According to Yikes (2017), the U.S. has a president whose policy can turn on a dime and take military action based on one televised incident! President Trump had long indicated a shift away from support for the moderate opposition in Syria. The day before the reported use of chemical weapons, the Trump administration publicly abandoned Obama’s policy that rejected Assad’s remaining in office. Yet two days later, the president ordered 59 missiles into a country without any declaration of war based on his emotional response to televised images of suffering. The whimsy of this behavior should alarm allies and the American people alike, not because of its empathy, but because it took such images for Trump to “get” the suffering of Syria’s horrific war, with its well publicized 400,000 war dead and its 11 million displaced. The next televised atrocity may provoke an even more drastic or disproportionate response without notice or cooperation.

The airstrikes reflect a disregard for multilateral organizations and approaches, and their international legal basis remains unclear. This unilateral strike does not reinforce allies’ expectations or investment in collective security arrangements or burden-sharing. Allies will be less likely to cooperate against enemies and more likely to go their own way. This approach may weaken multilateral platforms that have worked to spread the costs and risks of military action. Furthermore, while the U.S. strikes could be justified based on earlier U.N. resolutions and the need to protect American troops in Syria from chemical weapons, their basis in U.S. law or a U.N. Security Council resolution is contested (Yikes, 2017).

Impact of the U.S. Airstrikes on Syria

As some Americans who advocated that the administration should take a harder stance against the regime of Bashar Assad when the civil war first began, they should be pleased that the Trump administration launched cruise missiles against a Syrian regime airfield but nervous instead. The bombing strikes more as an attempt at therapy to solve their anguished conscience and feel like they are taking a stand than a serious move to change their policy in Syria for the better. The missile strikes occurred after the Syrian regime used a nerve agent (probably sarin) to kill dozens of civilians, including many children, in rebel-held parts of Idlib Province. Trump justified the strikes as a way to “prevent and deter the spread and use of deadly chemical weapons,” and it’s hard not to share the President’s outrage over the Assad regime’s willingness to slaughter its own citizens in such a horrific way (Stephen, 2013).

The strikes represented a dramatic shift in the administration’s policy. When he came into office, it seemed that Trump wanted to work with Russia in Syria against the Islamic State and implicitly accepted that Russia’s ally, the Assad regime, would stay in power. Just a few days ago, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and UN Ambassador Nikki Haley seemed to signal that the United States was no longer committed to removing Assad. Peace talks, not bombs,



seemed to be in the cards. It's pleasing that the Trump administration no longer wants to cozy up to one of the world's bloodiest dictators; one backed by Iran no less. In addition, their policy in Syria is no longer in sync with Moscow, and that's a good thing. Allying with Russia in the Middle East would anger U.S. allies and get the United States little in return. So, making a break from Russia here is promising, and it's also a sign that the administration will stand up to Moscow in Europe and elsewhere (Stephen, 2013).

Some Americans regretted that it took another use of chemical weapons, as opposed to the death of perhaps 500,000 people in Syria's civil war, to move America's conscience. If the strike does achieve the President's objective and Assad no longer uses chemical weapons against his own people, that's good news but it is little consolation for the tens of thousands of Syrians who are likely to die in the coming months from regime barrel bombs or indiscriminate Russian airstrikes or to be tortured and killed in the dictator's prisons (Stephen, 2013).

In a civil war that has claimed so many dead; the military impact of a missile strike on one facility is limited, even if it signals a profound shift in U.S. policy. Rather, such actions often are painted as "symbolic," but in reality, they usually signal weakness, not resolve. The dictator or terrorist on the receiving end suffers little but often looks stronger because they survived a U.S. attack and can boast about their defiance. In 1998, after al-Qaida bombed two U.S. embassies in Africa, the United States launched cruise missiles against facilities believed to be linked to terrorists in Afghanistan and Sudan Operation Infinite Reach. The strikes backfired, allowing Bin Laden to claim he was standing up to the United States. His popular support and associated ability to recruit soared, and al-Qaida terrorism continued undiminished. Contrast this with the sustained drone campaign against al-Qaida that began under President George W. Bush in the years after 9/11 and took off under Obama. This devastated al-Qaida, but it required years and many strikes. If a more sustained bombing campaign followed the cruise missile strikes, it might affect Assad's calculations more profoundly, but even then, air power alone has many limits if there is no force on the ground to magnify its impact. If the U.S. goal is deterrence, as Trump suggested in his remarks, this often requires sustained and repeated actions to bolster credibility so the most recent strike should only be the beginning (Stephen, 2013).

What was worrying was that the about-face against the Assad regime was not coordinated diplomatically. The U.S. was acting in haste, without making sure that the use of force is serving their political strategy rather than determining it. It is not clear what they are asking Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and other potential partners to do differently or how they are trying to get Assad's backers, particularly Russia (Iran is a lost cause on this) to decrease their support for the regime. Indeed, directly or indirectly U.S. may be risking a military conflict with Russia, and even if the Trump administration wants to confront Moscow over Syria, such an escalation demands careful thought, coordination, and planning. Most important, it is unclear what political settlement the United States wants in Syria and which actors Washington wants to empower, they know what we don't want, but it is less clear what they do want. The U.S. can feel good that they punched back against a dictator who is brutalizing his own people, but the bombing will do little to advance American goals in Syria without more dramatic and lasting changes (Stephen, 2013).

Another effect of the strike is increase in oil prices. Although Syria is not a major oil producer, many expect the oil price to spike, mainly because Western intervention in Syria is



likely to lead to a bigger regional conflict involving major oil producers and two strong allies to the Assad regime, Iran and Russia. More than two years into Syria's civil war, Assad is settling his bills for Russian arms orders to try to shore up ties with his most powerful ally, this Reuters investigation reveals. Oil prices have already hit an 18-month high, but if the civil war escalates with military strikes the oil price is expected to spike further, playing havoc with global markets as the cost of production soars (Stephen, 2013).

Some oil analysts are estimating that Brent Crude could rise above \$120 per barrel as a result of a military strike, while some, including those at Société Générale, see prices climbing to \$150 per barrel in the short-term. A possible spillover into Iraq, OPEC's second largest producer, would cut the volume of oil from the global market and raise prices. Iraq's Kirkuk oil pipeline has already been targeted six times in August. This has forced Iraq to cut oil shipments from pipeline by more than half for September.

Foreign Currency Troubles

Pressure on foreign reserves was considered another effect of the strike, this will be as a result of growth in the rise of energy prices rise, especially in countries dependent on imports. Some countries near to Syria are particularly vulnerable to foreign currency pressures, including Lebanon and Jordan whose currency reserves stand at near 10-year lows. This means they could have trouble covering the cost of imports if the conflict in Syria escalates. And the lower reserves fall, the more currency depreciation is possible and the more pressure on imports. In Syria, in the days following the US' announcement of possible military intervention, the Syrian pound has taken a beating on the black market.

Aside from the impact on the oil markets and the major oil producers tied to Syria, many other countries in the region could see an adverse impact on their economies because of Syrian strife. Turkey for example, already suffering from a hard to manage current account deficit, could see it widen as political instability weakens the lira and raises oil prices. Israel has threatened aggressive action if attacked by Hezbollah or the Syrian army, which could impact both Lebanon and other countries in the region if the conflict escalated fast.

CONCLUSION

The Obama Red line has portrayed the inherent feature of the democrats as they oppose wars and see it as a last resort. The red line was issued as a warning, a caveat and to threaten the Syrian government not to ever apply chemical weapon on its citizens, not because Obama wanted to deploy men in boot on Syrian soil. It was also responsive as Assad under the guide of Russia agreed for the destruction of the Syrian chemical stockpiles, which eased the tension between the United States and Syria.

Finally, the U.S. is basically trying to continue its trend of portraying its hegemonic power especially in the contemporary global order where they are seen as the major super power in the world and also standing on their quest of fighting any use of chemical or biological weapon against civilians under any condition as it may be.



RECOMMENDATIONS

Some of the recommendations provided by this paper are as follows:

- The United States should not with any state continue to support terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda in fighting anywhere in the world.
- The world must also put a stop to Saudi-Arabia's funding of such extremist groups within the Middle East and other regions around the world
- States should not be allowed to be making use of weapons of mass destruction, as it goes contrary to the international law
- Political solution between the people, government and opposition groups in Syria is the only way out of the Syrian crisis.

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