



## **TRUMP'S ADMINISTRATION AND PERSISTENT MISSILE TEST OF NORTH KOREA: IMPACT ON WORLD POLITICS**

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**ABSTRACT:** *The paper examines the nexus between the United States and Korean Missiles test which has continued to threaten peace in the North and East-Asian regions. Using the qualitative research as supported by conflict theory, findings show that, the Trump administration wanted to use China to remote-control North Korea, but he later discovered that he was wrong. The paper concludes that since Trump has criticised Obama for doing so over Syrian chemical weapons and then failing to carry out such red-line threat, President Trump may feel he can hardly afford the opprobrium that would follow should he fail to respond in this case. Although all attentions now are on fighting the COVID-19 pandemic and Trump showed that he is not likely to go to war with the limited strike that killed the Iranian military commander Sulaymani. The paper recommends the United States should continue to follow diplomatic path and engaging the international community as in the six party talks, to resolve the Korean Nuclear issue; the U.S. should desist in conducting such joint military drills with Japan and South Korea which continues to threaten the North and; the United Nations should not support the U.S. in imposing sanctions on North Korea, but find a better way of denuclearization.*

**KEYWORDS:** Trump, Administration, Missile Attack, North-Korea, World-Politics

### **INTRODUCTION**

History has recorded that 2016-2017 was a pivotal year for North Korea's nuclear and missile programmes. Numerous tests carried out throughout the year demonstrate that the regime is on the verge of developing thermonuclear warheads and intercontinental ballistic missiles, as well as the capability to launch missiles from ground facilities, submarines and mobile platforms. The US has responded by resorting to UN Security Council sanctions which have now become wide-ranging, having also been endorsed by China while in South Korea, more confrontational options have been proposed in recent months. The new leaderships in Washington and Seoul thus need to devise a new strategic approach to the DPRK's nuclear threat without, however, jeopardizing Northeast Asian stability, which has so far guaranteed economic growth and prosperity for the whole region (Revere, 2017).

North Korea's the nuclear and missile capabilities have developed well beyond the primitive nuclear programme that triggered the first United Nations sanctions in May 1993. After more than ten years since the country's first nuclear test, carried out in October 2006, Pyongyang's military breakthroughs of 2016 confirmed that the regime will shortly present a serious challenge not only to regional powers but likely also to the US mainland. Indeed, for the first time since the end of the Korean War Pyongyang seems to be on the verge of developing the



technological abilities, both in terms of warheads and ballistic missiles, that would allow the regime to pose a direct threat to US territory (Ji 2017 cited in Revere, 2017) .

These achievements prove, on the one hand, the success of the Byungjin (“parallel development”) strategy launched by Kim Jong-un in 2013, which has allowed the country to expand its nuclear and missile programmes and to partially recover its economy after the devastating 1990s famine. On the other hand, the international sanctions, aimed at squeezing North Korea’s weak economy and forcing the regime to return to the negotiating table, have failed to halt or even reduce the pace of the country’s military development. Over the last few years, US-led international efforts have increasingly resorted to UN Security Council sanctions, which have now become wide-ranging and comprehensive, having also consistently been actively supported by China. However, even if Beijing has adopted a less lenient approach vis-à-vis its historical ally it has so far proved to be unwilling to fully implement the sanctions. China’s primary goal is to maintain stability in North Korea since it represents a strategic buffer zone against the US military presence in the region and, as has been demonstrated on a number of occasions, it has used the cover of humanitarian aid to bypass its own sanctions on Pyongyang (Silberstein 2017).

The US was seriously concerned about North Korea’s military developments to the point that, during the 2016 electoral campaign, both vice-presidential candidates, Michael Pence and Tim Kaine, claimed to be in favour of possible pre-emptive strikes against North Korean military facilities in order to eradicate the problem. The United States is not the only regional actor that has begun reconsidering the idea of a direct confrontation: South Korea (the Republic of Korea, ROK), Washington’s long-term ally, which remains under direct threat from Pyongyang, shows a similar trajectory. After the failure of President Park Geun-hye’s Trustpolitik and of the Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative (NAPCI), as well as Park’s recent impeachment, more confrontational options have been advanced in Seoul. These range from extending military exercises and anti-missile defence to developing nuclear weapons in South Korea. Since a political transition is taking place in Washington and a presidential election is approaching in Seoul, the future currently appears uncertain: the new US administration will have to set a fresh course in order to deal with a nuclear-armed state while maintaining peace and stability in Northeast Asia (Lankov, 2017).

## Methodology

This paper utilized Qualitative Research method. The qualitative Research is exploratory research. It is used to gain an understanding of underlying reasons, opinions, and motivations. It provides insights into the problem or helps to develop ideas or hypotheses for potential quantitative studies. Qualitative Research is also used to uncover trends in thought and opinions, and dive deeper into the problem (Wyse, 2011). The qualitative research as used in this paper is hinged on the secondary method of data collection which is framed under library research. It is historical descriptive as it provides the description of events as have been unfolding between the United States and North Korea. The type of data employed in this paper is essentially secondary data and they were sourced from published journal articles, Newspaper publications, United Nation Official site among others.



## LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

**The Growing Nuclear Threat:** due to the DPRK's isolation, it is difficult to analyse and quantify the advancement of its nuclear programme. In this regard, the main source of information is the North Korean government itself, whose reliability can be questioned. The lack of data regarding the number and the efficiency of plants and centrifuges currently used by Pyongyang for the realization of weapons grade uranium (WGU) makes it difficult to estimate with certainty the number of warheads already completed. In 2012, a RAND Corporation report concluded that North Korea's nuclear capability is much lower than it looks, but it is inflated by the higher ranks of the regime (Schiller, 2012). This "bluff" hypothesis has both an internal and an external purpose. Internally, the North Korean regime is mainly concerned with convincing its elites, and especially its military, that it is creating a powerful state, which seems to be essential for regime survival.

Externally, the strategy is twofold: in addition to deterrence, the traditional purpose of any nuclear programme, Pyongyang also aims to gain bargaining leverage vis-à-vis the United States, its main security threat, and American allies in Northeast Asia. The objective, allegedly, is not the deployment of nuclear facilities during a conflict but the avoidance of the conflict altogether: The North Korean missile programme is intended for strategic leverage and political reasons, and not as a reliable operational tool for wartime use. However, while the "bluff" hypothesis could be used to accurately describe Kim Jong-il's "nuclear diplomacy", the divergent posture adopted by the country's new leader calls this view into question.

According to 2015 estimates, North Korea's current stockpile is composed of 6-8 plutonium-based warheads and 4-8 devices fashioned from uranium (Wit and Ahn, 2015). The country is nowadays considered to be self-sufficient for every stage required for the creation of nuclear weapons, as it can rely on industrial-scale uranium mines, processing plants for conversion and refinement, a fuel-fabrication plant, a nuclear reactor and a reprocessing plant. As demonstrated with the latest tests, North Korean engineers have acquired solid expertise on how to process plutonium-239 and highly enriched uranium (HEU), and how to stock fissile materials. However, the future growth of the country's nuclear arsenal will depend primarily on North Korea's ability to expand its uranium-enrichment programme. To date, it has been estimated that the country is able to produce 6 kg of plutonium per year (Nikitin, 2013).

The three tests carried out under the Kim Jong-un leadership demonstrate that the young leader has decided to distance himself from his father's nuclear strategy, regarded as more cautious and willing to use the arms race only as a diplomatic tool. With the advent of Kim Jong-un, the number of tests has grown exponentially, reaching its peak in 2016, and, as was confirmed by international observers, the latest two nuclear tests highlighted remarkable technological advancements. On 9 January 2016, Pyongyang announced that it had detonated its first thermonuclear warhead. Although the news met with general scepticism, the possibility cannot altogether be excluded that the regime has acquired the capability to build a two-stage bomb. According to US scientist Siegfried Hecker, it is unlikely that a real hydrogen fusion bomb was tested; however, it is possible that North Korean engineers managed to miniaturize the bomb by using "hydrogen" components (probably hydrogen fuel) to boost the explosion (Fyffe, 2016).



## THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

**Conflict Theory:** conflict theories are perspectives in sociology and social psychology that emphasize the social, political, or material inequality of a social group, that critique the broad socio-political system or that otherwise detract from structural functionalism and ideological conservatism. Conflict theories draw attention to power differentials, such as class conflict, and generally contrast historically dominant ideologies. It is therefore a macro level analysis of society. Karl Marx is the father of the social conflict theory, which is a component of the four paradigms of sociology. Certain conflict theories set out to highlight the ideological aspects inherent in traditional thought. While many of these perspectives hold parallels, conflict theory does not refer to a unified school of thought, and should not be confused with, for instance, peace and conflict studies, or any other specific theory of social conflict (Knapp 1994).

C. Wright Mills has been called the founder of modern conflict theory. In Mills's view, social structures are created through conflict between people with differing interests and resources. Individuals and resources, in turn, are influenced by these structures and by the "unequal distribution of power and resources in the society. The power elite of American society, (i.e., the military-industrial complex) had "emerged from the fusion of the corporate elite, the Pentagon, and the executive branch of government." Mills argued that the interests of these elites were opposed to those of the people. He theorized that the policies of the power elite would result in "increased escalation of conflict, production of weapons of mass destruction, and possibly the annihilation of the human race (Knapp 1994).

### North Korea's Nuclear Weapons and Ballistic Missiles Programs

This is the most obvious threat, but probably the most complicated. Last year, Kim told other North Korean leaders that his country would conduct a nuclear strike if it was threatened by "invasive hostile forces with nuclear weapons." It's a pretty vague intimidation nothing new when it comes to the North Korean leadership but the implication is clear: If North Korea feels like its sovereignty or an important national interest is threatened, it will seriously consider using a nuclear weapon to respond (Kim and Park, 2016).

To do that successfully, North Korea needs two things: a functioning nuclear weapon, and a way to deliver that weapon to a specific location. North Korea has both but caveats apply. There is currently no evidence that North Korea can place a nuclear warhead on an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and reliably hit any part of the US mainland or its territories. So, when Sen. Dan Sullivan (R-AK), a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, claims Kim "can press a button and hit Chicago," he's jumping the gun (Duhyeogn, 2017).

That signifies that North Korea has the potential to put a nuke on a medium-range missile that could reach South Korea and Japan two allies that host US military installations. Simply put, if North Korea wanted to strike South Korea and Japan with a nuclear weapon, it could likely do so. Making matters worse, any nuclear strike on those countries would put American troops stationed there directly in jeopardy.

This is partially why the United States has decided to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea to defend against certain missile strikes and why America is conducting missile interception tests with Japan. The situation is likely to get



worse in the position of Jeffrey (2017) who believed that North Korea will have intermediate-to long-range missiles capable of carrying a nuke to American soil ready for launch in about five years. That will soon put Guam, and potentially Hawaii and other parts of the United States, within North Korea's nuclear reach (Revere, 2017). It has been argued by Fifield (2017) that in 2017 alone, Pyongyang conducted three successful missile tests with two sets back including the one over the weekend. That's on top of the five nuclear tests it has conducted since October 2006. The country currently claims to be "primed and ready" to carry out a sixth nuclear test any day now (Fifield 2017).

Many important questions remain. For one, the size of North Korea's nuclear arsenal is a mystery, although estimates put it somewhere between 10 and 16 weapons. Second, it's unclear if Pyongyang has what is known as a "second-strike capability" that is, if North Korea were struck by a nuke, could it still retaliate with a powerful nuclear strike of its own? The jury is still out, but it is definitely trying to secure that capability. This matters a lot: If it has that ability, the stakes for any country thinking about attacking the North become exponentially higher, because they would then be susceptible to being hit by a North Korean nuke in response. In other words, it makes North Korea more dangerous and therefore gives them more leverage (Fifield, 2017).

In a frightening submission made by Ji (2017), Kim is said to have a hydrogen bomb, a far more powerful type of nuclear weapon than the run-of-the-mill atomic bomb we know he already has. His assertion has not been proven he more likely has a boosted atom bomb, which uses a radioactive form of hydrogen that makes it more powerful than a normal atom bomb but not nearly as powerful as a true hydrogen bomb. But if he does have a true hydrogen bomb, North Korea's enemies have an even bigger threat on their hands than previously thought (Ji, 2017).

### **Trump and the Burden of Decision**

In the arguments of Fifield (2017) President Trump has inherited from his predecessors an increasingly capable and more dangerous North Korea. The Pyongyang regime has conducted multiple successful nuclear weapon tests, developed miniaturized warheads that can be carried on some of its ballistic missiles, threatened to attack the United States and its allies with nuclear weapons, and declared that it is in the final stages of preparing to test an ICBM capable of hitting the continental United States. It is on President Trump's watch the DPRK has successfully tested a mobile, solid-fueled, medium-range ballistic missile that increases the danger to U.S. allies and U.S. regional bases by reducing the warning time before launch, increasing the difficulty of detecting the missile before launch, and enhancing the survivability of the North's missile arsenal. Once this missile is armed with a nuclear weapon, it will pose a formidable new challenge, including by giving North Korea a credible second-strike capability (Fifield, 2017).

President Trump has also inherited the legacy of failure by his four predecessors to end North Korea's nuclear weapons and missile programs. Today those programs endanger U.S. allies the Republic of Korea and Japan, as well as American bases in those countries and in the Western Pacific. And if we believe North Korea's assertions, those programs will soon pose a credible danger to the American homeland. That development will also take place on President Trump's watch. Trump has declared, "It won't happen." Kim Jong Un suggests that it surely will. According to Ji (2017) when President Trump came to power, the North





Korean leader had tried to put the American leader off balance by setting an aggressive agenda, using the threat of an ICBM test and demanding that Washington engages with Pyongyang in a new way. Kim Jong Un has also appealed to President Trump's deal-making instincts, hoping to engage the American president in a fashion that Trump's predecessors found unacceptable (Ji, 2017).

It has been clearly mentioned by Lankov (2017) that it remains to be seen whether President Trump will take the bait as he mulls his options, where he may face a North Korean challenge that is more dangerous and more intractable than that faced by his predecessors, a set of options that is narrower and riskier than ever, a China with a divergent agenda, and potential trouble on the horizon with America's South Korean ally (Lankov, 2017).

### **Probable Actions by the United States**

President Trump will soon decide the U.S. response to North Korea's challenge. North Korea's recent threats and announced plans argue that he must do so quickly. This made 2017 a critical year of decision for Trump, and for the Korean Peninsula. As he began to consider his options, he will quickly discover, as his immediate predecessor did, that they are few and unappealing. Some of the probable actions the United States might take according to Perry (2017), are as follows:

- 1. Accept a Nuclear-Armed North Korea:** The flaws and dangers of this approach have been discussed above. Whether done explicitly or under the guise of a "freeze" or a "cap," allowing North Korea to continue its nuclear-weapons activities would leave in place a capability that poses an existential threat to our allies and a direct threat to U.S. forces, bases, and resident Americans in the Asia-Pacific region and, soon, to the American homeland. America's South Korean and Japanese allies are likely to reject this option. Their fears about the lingering North Korean threat could prompt them to develop their own nuclear weapons. A U.S. approach that concedes the continued existence of an active North Korean nuclear program would undermine the security and confidence of our regional allies and put the NPT, and the United States itself, at risk. It would send the worst possible signal to Iran.
- 2. Take Military Action:** Some have argued that the urgency of the threat argues for taking military action, either to eliminate the DPRK's nuclear weapons and missile programs or, alternatively, to adopt an even bolder approach that would end the North Korean regime by force. Few would doubt the ability of America's military forces to destroy the bulk of North Korea's nuclear and missile infrastructure in a narrowly focused campaign. In a broader conflict aimed at toppling the regime, the United States and its ROK ally would surely prevail. But whether in a limited action or a major war, it is unlikely that all of Pyongyang's nuclear and missile assets would be eliminated before North Korea was able to launch a limited retaliation against the ROK, Japan, U.S. bases in the region, or even the United States itself.

An attack on the North's nuclear and missile infrastructure would likely precipitate a full-scale peninsular war. Even under the most optimistic scenario the North's conventional forces would still inflict massive damage on South Korea. Pyongyang would also be tempted to use its chemical, biological, and remaining nuclear



capabilities in such a conflict, and might well choose to strike first if it felt that an attack was imminent.

Military action is a dangerous option that would undermine regional stability, risk conflict with China, create peninsula-wide chaos, and cause major damage to the Republic of Korea.

3. **A “peace” Treaty:** Some have argued that it is time to accept North Korea’s proposal to replace the Korean War Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty. They argue that doing so would reduce tensions and create a framework for permanent peace. This option raises profound concerns, not the least of which is that North Korea is highly unlikely to end its nuclear-weapons and ballistic missile programs, even in return for such a treaty.

Should the United States negotiate a formal end to the Korean War that leaves in place a nuclear-armed North Korea? Is it realistic to hope that the act of signing a treaty would convince North Korea to denuclearize? Is the United States prepared to accept North Korea’s demand that South Korea be excluded from treaty negotiations? The answers to all of these questions are almost certainly negative. There is also the problem posed by North Korea’s strategic goal. Pyongyang’s ambitions extend beyond replacing the Armistice Agreement. The North wants to end U.S. “hostility” as the North defines it – meaning the end of the U.S.-ROK alliance. And North Korea’s ultimate goal is to pave the way for the reunification of the peninsula on its terms. A peace treaty that allows North Korea to retain its nuclear weapons is the vehicle that would make this possible.

4. **“Nukes for Everybody”:** During the presidential campaign Candidate Trump argued that, in the face of North Korea’s nuclear threat, South Korea and Japan should arm themselves with nuclear weapons. Were they to do so, would the U.S. extended deterrent commitment be withdrawn, since a nuclear-armed ROK and Japan would now be able to defend themselves? In the absence of that deterrent commitment there would probably be calls in both countries, and in the United States, to end the alliances, leaving the United States without strategic partners in a region of crucial importance to American interests. Beyond this, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by South Korea or Japan would further erode the NPT and justify Pyongyang’s continuing possession of nuclear weapons. And the proliferation of nuclear-armed states in the region would increase the chance of nuclear war.
5. **Count on China?** Relying on the PRC to resolve the North Korea challenge appeals to some, despite the overwhelming evidence that Beijing has no intention of doing so. Those who claim China can “solve” the North Korea problem fail to understand Beijing’s complex relationship with North Korea and its different priorities. While some believe Beijing is the solution to the North Korea nuclear challenge, the reality is that China is part of the problem.

Beijing is North Korea’s sole treaty ally, its major trading partner, and, increasingly, the regime’s lifeline. China’s withdrawal of support for North Korea or a massive cutback in assistance would precipitate a crisis that could probably compel the Pyongyang regime to alter its policies lest it risk collapse. Yet China has scrupulously avoided



taking drastic action against the North. Beijing holds that maintaining the stability of the North Korean regime is in China's strategic interest. China argues that the collapse of the North Korean regime would bring chaos to China's northeast border, including the possibility of a civil war or peninsular conflict. Such a conflict could spill over into China, lead to the use of nuclear weapons on China's periphery, cause the North to lose control of its weapons of mass destruction, create massive refugee flows, and more. Faced with this nightmare, China's preference is for the status quo, even if this means tolerating North Korea's nuclear ambitions.

6. **Time for a Different Approach:** Past efforts to denuclearize North Korea have all failed, and the options listed above also are destined to fail. Accordingly, it is time to try something different. And if the threat posed by North Korea is more immediate than ever, then a new approach must reflect a much greater sense of urgency. The new U.S. administration should consider making another major effort to convince, indeed compel, North Korea to return to the negotiating table to resume implementing its denuclearization commitments. A diplomatic solution may not be possible, but it is worth trying once again to achieve one. To do this, the United States should adopt an approach it has not tried before. It is time for the United States, in cooperation with its allies and partners, to put at risk the one thing that North Korea regards as more precious than its nuclear weapons—the existence of its regime—in order to convince Pyongyang to end its pursuit of nuclear weapons. North Korean officials tell us their goal is to maintain their regime; they say nuclear weapons will guarantee the regime's survival. The United States must convince Pyongyang otherwise.

### **Long Term Consequences of North Korea Nuclear Weapon Production**

The US has maintained that an aggressive rogue state should not be given access to nuclear weapons. In the face of such far reaching consequences, Trump administration is still shaky with its North Korea policy and Donald Trump has, in addition, launched an attack on South Korea by asking it to pay for the deployment of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system. With the economic sanctions that the US can impose – though not as major as North Korea's trade ally, China, the balance is tipped in favour of US. For North Korea, the development of Taepodong-2 successfully will help secure the odds in its favour. The development of its nuclear weapons will also force US allies South Korea and Japan to develop nuclear weapons of its own as it lies under direct threat from North Korea, even with its mid-range ballistic missiles. This will cause nuclear proliferation, violating the terms of the non-proliferation treaty signed by these countries.

North Korea has defied not just the US but also the UN in its ballistic missile test. With consecutive tests since the beginning of the year, North Korea seemingly remains undaunted by the war of words happening against it. It remains to be seen what concrete action US takes against it.

### **The Alternative Approach for Donald Trump**

The only way out of this predicament is to resume talks with North Korea to probe whether it is willing to suspend its nuclear and missile programs. That objective has been the focus of all three agreements that the US has made with North Korea: the 1994 Agreed Framework, the Six-Party joint statement of Sept. 19, 2005; and the 2012 Leap Day deal. Contrary to





conventional wisdom, the first two accords did enjoy some success. The 1994 accord halted all fissile material production in North Korea for more than nine years, until the administration of US President George W. Bush scrapped it on the basis of US intelligence reports that Pyongyang was secretly acquiring the means to enrich uranium without bothering to probe North Korea's October 2002 offer to negotiate the issue. In addition, a halt to Pyongyang's missile programs was agreed in principle by the administration of US President Bill Clinton in 2000, only for the Bush administration to refuse to negotiate further (Vu, 2016).

The 2005 accord was nearly stillborn when, two days before it was finalized, the US Treasury Department threatened to deny access to American financial institutions for all banks that did business with North Korea, starting with Banco Delta Asia in Macau. An ensuing run on that bank prompted Macau authorities to seize North Korean funds in the bank. Pyongyang demanded that the funds be repatriated before it would carry out the accord. Unrequited, it conducted its first nuclear test in October 2006. Within days, Washington agreed to discuss the return of the funds. Once that was done, Pyongyang ceased all fissile material production at Yongbyon as well as nuclear tests and missile test-launches — only to have the deal fall apart in 2009 after South Korea failed to deliver promised energy aid. The Leap Day deal collapsed almost immediately when North Korea went ahead with a failed satellite launch in 2013, despite a US warning that such a move would be a deal-breaker (The Telegraph, 2016).

### **The Impact of Conflict between Trump Administration and Persistent Nuclear Test by North Korea to the Region and the World**

If there is a conflict where North Korea deploys many of its deadly weapons, what happens when the dust settles?

North Korean attacks on South Korea or any other of its neighbours “would be fundamentally disruptive” to the region and the world (Robert, 2017). Jeff (2017), also agreed to this argument when he posited that, such a conflict could lead to a big slump in the global economy, cause humanitarian suffering, and pit great powers against one another.

The economic consequences of Japan and/or South Korea, respectively the third and 11th biggest world economies, reeling from a big attack would impact the world's financial future. The humanitarian consequences would also be dire according to Jeff (2017). Millions of hungry, displaced people would be trapped on a small peninsula during a brutal war. Meanwhile, tensions would rise as great powers like China, Russia, and the United States would likely be drawn further into the fray. That's already happening, in a way, as Russian and Chinese ships tail America's carrier strike group in the region. They both call for “restraint” in these tense times between America and North Korea.

Trump seems to have gained a healthy appreciation of the seriousness and complexity of the North Korea challenge, calling it the “greatest immediate threat” to the United States. Initially, Trump thought China could use its economic and diplomatic influence over North Korea to quickly quell the threat. But after meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping at Mar-a-Lago, his perspective changed, admitting that his original solution was too simplistic.

The good news, in other words, is that Trump now has a more realistic sense of the enormity of the North Korea threat. The bad news is that it's not clear that he has any real idea of what to do about it.



## CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Such a prospect as conflict, though, will not appeal to the Trump White House, and given that his administration is already putting far more emphasis on military thinking and options, there is a risk that in the coming months the decision may be taken to undertake pre-emptive military action against North Korea's warhead and missile production facilities. This is a highly unwelcome and potentially disastrous prospect to the world politics but Trump has said that North Korea has to curb its ambitions. In effect he has drawn a red line and, since he criticised Mr. Obama for doing so over Syrian chemical weapons and then failing to carry out his threat, President Trump may feel he can hardly afford the opprobrium that would follow should he fail to respond in this case. Although all attentions now are on fighting the COVID-19 pandemic and Trump showed that he is not likely to go war with the limited strike that killed the Iranian military commander Sulaymani.

- The United States should continue to follow diplomatic path and engaging the international community as in the six party talks, to resolve the Korean Nuclear issue.
- The U.S. should desist in conducting such joint military drills with Japan and South Korea which continues to threaten the North.
- The United Nations should not support the U.S. in imposing sanctions on North Korea, but find a better way of denuclearization.

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